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ABSTRACT 
 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE GREAT CONTENTIONS: EXPLAINING THE 
DIFFUSION OF CRISES WITH MACHINE LEARNING AND ARCHIVES 
Doğa Kerestecioğlu 
Mauro F. Guillén 
This dissertation presents three articles that study crises from a 
sociological perspective. The first two articles studies the effects of global trade 
networks on financial and political crises with the implantation of big data and 
supervised machine learning methods on a dataset for a sample of 70 countries 
for the years between 1962 and 2009. Using the institutional and network 
theories, the first article finds support that normative pressures lead countries to 
commit sovereign defaults. Countries are more likely to commit sovereign default 
if other structurally equivalent or role equivalent countries did so in the previous 
year. The second article finds that role equivalent and structurally equivalent 
countries occupying a similar position in the global trade networks are affected 
similarly by revolutionary waves and experience revolutionary situations 
simultaneously. The third article argues that state secularization is a process 
involving mobilization, political tactics, and resources as opposing forces struggle 
over three major institutional dimensions. Examining the history of state 
xiv 
 
secularization in Turkey, Mexico, and France in the aftermath of revolutions, this 
article demonstrates that the degree of secularization is determined by political 
contention. (1) The revolutionary state attempts to seize church property, which 
opens the way for further struggles. (2) If the church administers law through its 
own courts, or has an autonomous code of law, revolutionary states struggle to 
substitute secular courts and state-enacted law. (3) Churches often control 
education; a revolutionary state eventually attempts to take control of education 
when it mobilizes sufficient resources for the required state capacity. Taking all 
these dimensions together, the struggle over secularization has many partial 
outcomes and stopping places, and thus mixed patterns are much more typical 
than an ideal type transition to pure secularist modernity.  
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PREFACE 
1. Crisis and Sociology 
This dissertation presents three articles that focus on understudied issues 
regarding crises in the sociological literature. Crises by definition are rare, but 
they are key and frequent events that punctuate processes of state building, 
episodes of international conflict, and other macro trends. Sociologists have been 
studying crises in one form or another ever since the inception of the field. In its 
earliest days a specific form of crises, revolution, has received close attention. 
This was mostly due to the fact that when sociology was coined as a social 
science, it happened in a period of history that was heavily affected by the French 
Revolution and its aftermath. The dominant paradigm of the Enlightenment at 
the time had a path-dependent effect on how revolutions and crises in sociology 
came to be studied over the last century or so.  
Affected by this positivist paradigm of their period, theories presented by 
Marx and Engels assumed that the existence of natural laws applied to not only 
hard science such as physics, chemistry, and biology, but also for the social 
sciences. This supposition lead them to argue that revolutions play a significant 
role in the societies as marking the point in time when the societies move from 
one specific stage to another. 
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Despite the changing paradigms and dominant theories in sociology over 
the centuries, this special status conferred upon revolutions has persisted mostly 
unchanged. Revolution has been one of the most common topics in the field of 
historical and comparative sociology, which consistently built upon a coherent 
literature on revolutions. The evolution of theories in the field over decades has 
been well documented (Goldstone 1980, Goodwin 1994).  
An interesting and striking fact about these theories is that until recently 
revolutions were perceived as special and significant, unique events. While recent 
generations of revolution theories allow for discussion over types of revolutions 
and whether certain events qualify as a revolution or not, the general assumption 
in the field is that revolutions are a specific type of social phenomenon that has 
its own unique causes and dynamics. This is mainly due to the path-dependent 
evolution of the theories starting from the Marxian notion that revolutions are 
supposed to have a transformational effect, progressing societies from a certain 
stage to the next one.  
As such, historically, most attention has been paid to causes and the 
periods leading to the revolutions, rather than its aftermath. This also led to 
successful revolutions being used as a unit of analysis, instead of crises, which 
covers a greater spectrum of events under the definition of the term1. This trend 
was recently identified by both in the subfield of revolutions and in other related 
subfields that deal with different types of contention in societies. There have been 
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calls for focusing research on the aftermaths of revolutions (Goldstone 2001). 
There have also been calls for studying revolutions along with other dynamics of 
contention such as conflict, social movements, etc. with the notion that all these 
varying types of contention might be affected by the same dynamics (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
This dissertation recognizes the dearth in research pointed out by these 
calls and presents three articles that informs on these issues by focusing on the 
conditions leading to crises, and the patterns that happen in their aftermath. By 
using quantitative methods such as machine learning and statistical modeling, 
the first two articles focus on two different forms of crises and study how they 
diffuse globally. These methods allow for the study of a larger number of cases 
and observations from big data to scrutinize crises as the dependent variable. 
Studying crises, in place of revolutions, allow for learning from not only a limited 
number of successful cases matched to similar failed ones, but from a 
comprehensive systematic comparison of all potential cases. The third article 
presents a study on the aftermath of revolutions, the severest form of crises, to 
identify patterns that lead to stability. 
2. Global Diffusion of Crises 
The commonly preferred methodology in theories of revolution is 
comparative historical methods that favor in-depth case studies and qualitative 
methods that are occasionally also supported by demographic or statistical 
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models. These approaches allow the researchers to gather highly detailed 
information regarding the processes that underlie revolutions and compare them 
to other potential cases that had different outcomes. While these approaches are 
extremely useful for explaining the causal mechanisms that lead to revolutions, 
the number of cases they can study are limited. In practice, researchers are 
required to study thousands of historical documents in multiple languages and 
analyze them in depth before they can implement a systematic comparison to 
discover these patterns. These methods are highly fitting for the original 
questions of the literature that are interested in studying specific great 
revolutions in the history. Skocpol (1979)’s classic work studying the social 
revolutions in France, Russia, and China is a typical example of this, as the 
author’s main interest is explaining social revolutions and the author finds the 
three cases to be the most fitting examples of these phenomena in history.  
When the goal is to only explain a handful of cases in history, historical 
and comparative methods are the most fitting ones; however, when the subject is 
approached from a dynamics of contention perspective, where the goal is to 
discover common dynamics that underlie various types of conflict, the limited 
number of cases allowed by the qualitative methods become less satisfactory. The 
number of contentions that take place decreases as the severity of the contention 
increases. Contentious cases with lower severity, such as demonstrations or riots, 
take place much more commonly than high severity cases, like revolutions or 
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rebellions. As there are thousands of these low severity cases compared to the 
high severity ones, studying them using historical and comparative methods is 
problematic during the process of case selection. While selecting ideal type cases 
for revolutions might be possible due to their rarity, it is harder to select an ideal 
type case that is exemplary of all demonstrations or riots. It is even more difficult 
to select failed cases to which to compare. 
For example, a common finding in theories of revolution is that 
international strains play a significant role in leading to state breakdowns. 
Traditionally these strains are studied from a bilateral perspective and 
researchers mostly pay attention to the greatest of these strains such as 
international warfare. Yet, international strains are not only limited international 
warfare, nor do these strains solely result from relationships in which the focal 
country engages.  
To remedy this problem, this article opts for using big data and supervised 
and unsupervised machine learning techniques to account for the great number 
of variables potentially having effects. If the dynamics of contention are similar in 
cases of varying severity, one should observe similar conditions affecting the 
outcomes. In other words, different types of contention should be affected by 
similar variables. Two of the articles presented in this dissertation focuses on two 
different but highly severe types of crises: external sovereign defaults and 
revolutionary situations.  
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External sovereign defaults, as frequently evidenced in literature, is closely 
related to the willingness of the states to pay their debt and happens when they 
are no longer willing to honor their previous agreements. This key concept of 
willingness to pay, which determines whether states commit an external 
sovereign default or not, qualifies sovereign defaults as a case of contention. The 
parties involved in the crises, debtor country and lenders, engage in political 
contention over the terms of a potential default or restructuring of the debt. 
Meanwhile, the debtor country risking bankruptcy also faces political contention 
locally with its subjects, who will be affected greatly by the outcome. As such, 
economic crises are neither solely economic nor financial events. Instead, they 
should be studied as contentious events that are affected by similar dynamics as 
other types of contentious events. 
Revolutionary situations, similar to successful revolutions, are contentious 
events with the highest severity. There will be special conditions for when these 
revolutionary situations will end up as successful cases, which are studied in 
depth by the existing literature, but there are fewer studies that try to discover 
common strains that lead to all potential revolutionary situations. If the school of 
thought introduced by dynamics of contention is valid, then one should expect 
similar dynamics to affect both successful and failed cases of revolutions, 
regardless of their outcome. 
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A systematic comparison of dynamics that has a significant effect on both 
sovereign defaults and revolutionary situations is not immediately apparent or 
intuitive. This is, where recent technological developments in data collection and 
analysis come to aid. This dissertation favors the use of graph theory, methods 
developed by social networks theory, and big data to develop a comprehensive 
study that discovers the common variables that serve as significant dynamics of 
contention. 
An in-depth review of the existing literature focusing on these two 
different types of contention reveals that there is ample evidence that patterns of 
trade have a significant role. Both articles presented in this dissertation use big 
data, methods suggested by graph theory, and social networks analysis to build 
measures that can test the effects of trade ties on these crises. The results in both 
articles demonstrate that similar dynamics of trade play a significant role in 
leading to the two different types of crises and leads credence to the approach 
suggested by dynamics of contention.  
3. Why Big Data? 
Advances in technology and innovations in data collection and storage 
have lead to an immense amount of data accumulation that did not exist in prior 
stages of human history. In our present day, more data is available to researchers 
than there ever was. As of the writing date of this dissertation, there is an 
apprehension towards big data in the field of sociology2; however, as evidenced 
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by the articles in this dissertation with a solid theoretical foundation, big data can 
be a powerful tool in sociological research. 
As sociologists, for decades we have focused on the motivations and 
actions of individuals. Big data—whether it is provided through technological 
companies such as Twitter or Facebook, or international organizations such as 
United Nations—and advanced computers allow researchers to study millions of 
observations at once and control for all the variables that might be affecting a 
phenomenon. One big advantage of the existing big data that is presently 
available to researchers is the fact that it reports on the actions that individuals 
have taken, instead of motivations that they claim. Data coming from a tweet, an 
individual posts on the internet, or trade data reported by United Nations is not 
an opinion claimed or a memory recalled, but actual action that was carried out 
by the subject in study. This presents itself as a great strength over survey results, 
where the researchers have to deal with various problems of recall and cognition 
that lead to reliability and validity errors. 
The biggest problem that arrives with big data is the sheer size of the data 
that the researcher has to deal with. Social sciences and their quantitative 
methods have developed over the years to deal with the scarcity of data and 
dealing with small datasets. Once the researchers no longer deal with small 
samples of larger populations, the p-values that they tend to rely on and accept 
become less meaningful. Mathematically, as the sizes of the samples increase, the 
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p-values decrease. The researchers need to be aware of this fact and not simply 
rely on small values derived from millions of observations; however, this should 
not mean that they should simply ignore the new resources available to them. 
The articles in this dissertation use ensemble methods to deal with this 
problem. Motivated by the literature, I collected highly granular data on the trade 
behavior for a sample of 70 countries. Based on data that was reported by United 
Nations on types of products countries have imported and exported, I have 
gathered data on approximately 30 million3 observations over 47 years. I also 
gathered data on bilateral trade between countries as reported by the Correlates 
of War Project.  
While it is not possible to implement a systematic comparison of so many 
observations using historical and comparative methods nor is it reliable to 
conduct causal inference using statistical methods over such a large amount of 
observations, I have used methods derived from graph theory and social 
networks methods to implement dimensionality reduction. To put things into 
perspective in relation to the problem of limited number of cases a researcher can 
systematically study when using qualitative methods, the number of bilateral 
trade relationships between the countries reported for my sample between the 
years 1962 and 2009 is 108,590. It is not humanly possible to keep track of so 
many relationships from a qualitative perspective. 
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The methods derived from graph theory and social networks analysis 
allowed me to make systematic analyses of all of these relationships along with 
accounting for other variables. I came up with measures that consider how the 
position of one country has changed in comparison to others in the world society 
across years when these millions of relationships across the world were held into 
account. It is significant that both articles in this dissertation find that the 
measures that were derived using the same big data and machine learning 
methods had similar effects on two different types of contention that were 
previously assumed to be of different causes. In fact, these two types of crises are 
traditionally studied by two different disciplines of social sciences. On one hand, 
categorized as a type of financial crises, sovereign defaults are commonly seen as 
a subject covered by research in the field of economics. On the other hand, 
revolutionary situations are categorized as either political or sociological 
phenomena and are commonly studied by sociologists and political scientists. As 
these dissertation reveals, even crises that are solely seen to be derived by 
economic factors should be studied from a sociological perspective and 
sociological variables should be taken into account in their explanations. 
4. The Aftermath of Revolutions 
The final article in this dissertation pays attention to the aftermath of 
crises, which was recognized as an understudied issue in a recent call in the 
literature mentioned above. Motivated by the finding that crises tend to diffuse 
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around countries with similar types of culture, it studies three cases that had a 
similar type of outcome following revolutions. 
Because of the exploratory nature of the question posed by the literature, I 
have opted for an in-depth study of three historical cases using comparative and 
historical methods. This study reveals that there is a pattern to post-
revolutionary state formation when the challenger groups find themselves facing 
against an incumbent political group that are mainly legitimated through a 
religious authority. Studying the cases of France, Mexico, and Turkey in the 
aftermath of revolutions, I observe that the methods of post-revolutionaries 
implemented by the French in their earlier experiences diffuse into the later cases 
of Mexico and Turkey. 
The article identifies the major dimensions of political struggles that have 
a determining effect on the degree of secularism a state will have in the aftermath 
of a revolution. As the political crises resulting from struggles between modern 
states and religious authorities are still an ongoing problem in our present day, 
the findings regarding the underlying patterns for what results in a ‘settled time’ 
following a revolution is valuable for understanding current cases as well. 
5. Dissertation Plan 
The first article in the dissertation studies the effects of global trade 
network structure on sovereign defaults. It finds that countries that are 
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structurally equivalent in the global trade networks are more likely to commit 
sovereign defaults during the same waves of financial crises in historical time 
periods. 
The following article studies the effects of global trade network structure 
on revolutionary situations. Similar to the first article, it finds that structurally 
equivalent and role equivalent countries are likely to be affected during the same 
revolutionary waves. While these two articles are motivated by relevant 
literatures studying their specific phenomenon, they use similar statistical and 
machine learning methods that rely on big data and quantitative analyses. This is 
a significant point, which not only reveals that different subfields of sociology 
have valuable contributions for each other, but also strengthens the point made 
by dynamics of contention literature: different types of contention are likely to be 
affected by similar strains.  
The third article is an in-depth study of aftermath of crises and presents a 
theory of secularizing revolutions by analyzing the cases of France, Mexico, and 
Turkey. It reveals a pattern that secularization happens through struggles across 
religious property, civic rights, law, and education. The final chapter concludes 
the dissertation with a summary of conclusions and potential avenues for future 
research with lessons based on these three articles. 
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ARTICLE 1: EXPLANING FINANCIAL CRISES THROUGH GLOBAL 
TRADE NETWORKS: THE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULTS AND SOVEREIGN STATES’ 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY1 
1. Abstract 
In sovereign bankruptcies, willingness to pay plays a more significant role than in 
the case of individual or corporate bankruptcies. This results in sociological 
processes taking place at a global level affecting the decisions of individual 
countries when they face financial hardships. How countries identify themselves 
among others, and how they are identified by the world society, affects their 
default behavior. Trade is one of the most important relationships that countries 
constantly and frequently engaged in, and as such they can be used for 
determining countries positions in the global space. Using the institutional and 
network theories, this article uses unsupervised machine learning to process big 
data reporting on volumes of products traded to implement dimensionality 
reduction to analyze millions of observations on traded products. Based on a 
dataset of 70 countries reporting on social, political, and economic features for 
the years between 1962 to 2009, I find support that normative pressures lead 
countries to commit sovereign defaults. Countries are more likely to commit 
sovereign default other structurally equivalent or role equivalent countries did so 
in the previous year. 
                                                   
1 This article is co-authored with Mauro F. Guillen 
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2. Introduction 
In the market economy, crises are as old as the existence of the capitalist 
system itself (Arrighi [1994] 2010). The sociological literature sees economic 
crises as a necessary condition for social and political change, especially social 
revolutions (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1993). They also play an important role in 
determining the hegemonic structure of the world-system (Wallerstein [1974] 
2011; Arrighi 2010).  
In recent decades, most crises—especially financial ones—occurred in 
emerging economies. The global financial crisis of 2008; however, represents a 
stark reminder that no economy is immune from the market system running 
amok. Even after the U.S. economy has (partially) recovered from the crisis, as 
late as 2013, there was a non-zero-probability risk of default due to the stalemate 
in Congress, resulting in a downgrading of U.S. government debt by the credit 
rating agencies, although a U.S. default would be purely “technical1.” 
This idiosyncratic event in the U.S. financial history is just a particularly 
striking example of a more general finding. Financial crises are driven not just by 
economic fundamentals but also by social and political processes at the state and 
global levels (Carruthers and Kim 2011). One specific type of financial debacle 
that tends to play an especially important role in state building and in 
international conflicts is the sovereign debt crisis and default. The extraction 
power by states and the ability to raise revenue play an important role in 
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determining the state’s capacity to engage in policymaking (Centeno 1997; Tilly 
[1990] 1992).  
This article focuses on social-structural processes at the global level that 
affect the financial capacity of states. We develop arguments about how the 
interconnections between pairs of countries affect the propensity of a country 
declaring itself in default. In economic and financial analyses of default, state 
actors are assumed to be rational decision makers with the ability to assess 
macroeconomic fundamentals and act accordingly. The macroeconomic variables 
entertained in these analyses include fiscal deficit, inflation, GDP growth, and 
exchange rate overvaluation, among flow variables, and debt-to GDP ratio and 
short-term debt among stock variables. Economic and financial perspectives 
provide a baseline argument for sovereign defaults arguing that they happen 
when states lose the ability to service their debts. This has motivated research-
developing measures of solvency, liquidity, deficits, and volatility to predict their 
effects on sovereign defaults (Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001; Hemming, Kell, 
and Shimmelpfenning 2005; Catão and Sutton 2002). While there is a wide 
agreement that economic indicators are significant, there is debate on whether 
political variables are significant or not. Existing research has shown that 
political uncertainty leads to economic uncertainty (Manasse, Roubini, and 
Schimmelpfenning 2003), and democracy plays a significant role in external 
sovereign defaults (Verma 2002), but others find that “political events and 
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variables do not add any additional information once economic factors have been 
accounted for” (Haque 1998, 12).  
These perspectives, however, either downplay or ignore the social 
processes that take place at a more global-structural level. The socially 
constructed nature of global finance is frequently neglected in market approaches 
(Carruthers 2011; Biggart 1991).  In order to account for these shortcomings more 
recent research identified willingness-to-pay to have a central role in declaring 
sovereign defaults (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Even if there might not be well-
defined procedures against a sovereign default from the creditors, the indirect 
costs are still significant enough to deter states from reverting to defaults as the 
first best option. In fact it is the existence of these indirect costs that allow for the 
existence of sovereign debt. Had such indirect costs not existed, the states would 
simply default in every given opportunity. Willingness-to-pay is explained 
through countries making decisions based on their perceived costs of defaulting, 
including loss of autonomy, tarnishing of national prestige, and international 
ostracism. Assuming an anarchic space with no overseeing authority, Tomz 
(2007) argues that reputational costs allow sovereign lending and stresses that 
context matters in decision to default. He argues that the defaults of the Russia, 
Mexico, and Ecuador happened “when external conditions did not justify a lapse” 
(228), and thus they were not allowed to borrow for the rest of the decade. 
Borensztein and Panizza have identified three additional categories of costs that 
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also play a significant role in decision-making process before committing 
defaults. These include “international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic 
economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities” 
(Borensztein and Panizza 2009, 5).   
Despite the acknowledgment of the importance of willingness-to-pay by 
this line of research, assumptions of an anarchic global space and atomized 
decision making are not satisfactory from a sociological perspective. The 
willingness to pay is usually associated with the internal traits of countries, such 
as credit culture and stability of the political system (Tomz and Wright 2013). 
Yet, defaults do not take place in isolation, as one empirically observes a 
clustering of defaults over time (see Figure I). The peak years in terms of defaults 
are 1828, 1876, 1932, and 1983. In other words, sovereign defaults occur in 
waves, with several states getting into trouble simultaneously. It seems that once 
a country defaults, others tend to follow suit, as in the Latin American debt crisis 
of 1982, and the East Asian flu crisis of 1996. Economists explain this clustering 
by reference to business cycles, where credit booms typically result in sovereign 
defaults (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006). 
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Figure I - External Defaults Since 1800 
Sociological research shows that institutional and cognitive processes 
(Carruthers 2011; Swedberg 2011), organizational structures and regulation 
(Guillén and Suarez 2011; Palmer and Maher 2011), and historical processes 
(Fligstein and Goldstein 2011; Dobbin 1994; Mizruchi 2011) play significant roles 
in economic crises. Changes in organizational structure, regulation, and political 
context may lead actors to readjust their considerations for short-term effects, 
which might lead to crisis-prone situations in the long run (Krippner 2011). The 
common conclusion underlying the sociological literature is the embeddedness of 
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the actors, whether they are individuals, organizations, or political entities, 
within a social network, where they are affected by their ties. However, many 
studies mostly focus on the US due to its role as a financial leader. Both this 
common finding and the trajectory of the global crisis, which first began as a 
mortgage crisis in the US but then diffused to other countries, and mutated to 
become a sovereign debt crisis in Europe reveals that finance, or more 
specifically, sovereign debt is not an issue specific to single countries but it is a 
matter embedded in the global finance system. Existing research within countries 
can be improved by transnational research that considers not only one country 
but also the connectedness of the global economy.  
In this article, we improve upon the existing literature by testing measures 
of interconnectedness and reveal the significant effects that relationships 
between countries have on sovereign defaults. We develop two hypotheses based 
on two dominant global-level theories, world polity and world-system. We argue 
that learning and similarity in behavior happens among states that trade more 
with each other instead of having a diffused pattern of trade spread evenly across 
all countries. We also find that states occupying a similar position in the global 
trade structure will experience crises at similar points in time.  
3. The Ambiguities of Sovereign Defaults in A Global Economy 
Bankruptcy is one of the foundational elements of the market economy 
because it provides an exit mechanism for individuals, companies and entire 
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countries. Sovereign defaults are a foundational and important element of the 
global economic system. They have been a part of the global economy since the 
existence of modern nation-states. The first modern nation-states also happened 
to be the first serial defaulters. England, the Italian city-states, France, and 
Portugal were all defaulted repeatedly before the 1800s, i.e. until they could 
establish stable national economies and strong institutions (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009).  Defaults became more common after industrialization. This happened 
due to two reasons. First, more modern nation-states became established in the 
global political arena. It is only after a modern nation-state establishes a national 
economy that it can have the capacity to carry out substantive amounts of 
borrowing. Without a large borrowing capacity, states cannot incur sufficient 
sovereign debts to default. Second, the creation of markets for public debt 
increased both the size and depth of financial markets. Markets for public debt 
increased potential capacity for sovereign debt incurred by states, which 
increased the potential for borrowing beyond capacity, leading to sovereign 
defaults. 
 Public debt continues to be a core element in the present global economy. 
However, public debt is different from private debt. For private agents, lending 
and borrowing are routine activities. When investments do not pay off as 
planned, bankruptcy is a regular outcome for underperforming firms; when firms 
fail, there are clear guidelines about how lenders can take action using the state 
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as a mediator. Creditors can make claims on the assets of the bankrupt debtor 
and retrieve some (if not all) of their loss. However, the process changes when the 
bankrupt agent is a sovereign state. While it may have been tried in the past, 
gunboat diplomacy is too costly for states to coerce other states into paying their 
debts. Moreover, at the present time declaring war over another state due to 
economic failures is no longer legitimate. There is no single international 
overseer legal agency to facilitate the default of a sovereign. Most states’ assets 
cannot be appropriated when states default on their debt because such assets are 
usually immune and off limits. The claims of creditors are not well defined and it 
is unlikely for judges to rule against their own state (Yeyati 2005; Borensztein 
and Panizza 2009). Bankrupt states do not go out of business, either. States 
continue to exist in their sovereign capacity. They might default on some of their 
debt instead of going completely bankrupt. In other cases, when facing the 
default of a debtor, lenders might choose to pre-emptively bail them out to 
prevent greater overall costs. While defaults have been common in the global 
economy throughout the history, the legitimate ways to resolve them has varied 
across different time periods.  
This creates an ambiguous situation in terms of power between lenders 
and borrowers. While lender states and other parties are powerful due to their 
economic capacity, debtor states can also become powerful as lender states 
become dependent on collecting the debt. In the case of sovereign defaults, the 
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issue becomes even more complicated given Borensztein and Panizza’s (2009) 
conclusion that the economic effects of sovereign defaults tend to be short-lived, 
and usually do not extend beyond two years. The dependency increases with the 
amount of debt. Focusing solely on the countries that participate in lending and 
borrowing from each other is not sufficient to understand the entire mechanism 
underlying sovereign lending. In order to get a complete picture of the sovereign 
lending system, one should also account for the global-level mechanisms that 
play an underlying role in the bilateral relationships. Sociologists have long 
demonstrated that cultural construction of nation states play a role in 
determining legitimate behavior, which effects decision making (Meyer 2010), 
and global trade patterns play a significant role in how power is distributed 
among countries that occupy different spaces in the world system (Wallerstein 
[1974] 2011; Arrighi [1994] 2010).  
Institutional processes can play a significant role in determining the 
behavior of states as they participate in a common world polity and strive for 
legitimacy independent of their efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This results 
in mimetic processes among states, where they replicate each other’s behavior. 
The behavior of other states that is deemed legitimate is replicated. As states have 
become globally more connected, they have structurally expanded around the 
globe. This process has legitimated the world models helping in the consolidation 
of a world society. In this new world society, the states’ responsibilities have 
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increased compared to earlier eras (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1997; Meyer 2010). 
While they have been required as necessary actors to make and enforce rules, 
they have also been expected to remain legitimate within the world polity and 
society. While the expansion of world society has resulted in increasing 
convergence, the result is not increasing flattening of the world polity. Instead, 
the world polity becomes more fragmented and regionalized (Beckfield 2010). In 
other words, the perception of legitimacy across the world society is not flat but 
instead may vary across different states based on their varied connections with 
each other.  
In a global system in which countries interact with one another, they start 
to influence each other’s actions, resulting in the formation of a collective culture. 
Let us build the argument about cohesion from the group level to the 
organizational field, and then to the world-polity and world-system level. High 
social density translates into social cohesion, which in turn tends to produce 
behavioral similarity (Durkheim [1915] 1995; Durkheim [1933] 1997; Collins 
1994). Actors in social networks who share strong connections to one another 
tend to develop strong group identity, solidarity and conformity. Cohesive 
networks establish “sacred objects”, i.e. symbols of focused attention that 
demarcate the boundaries of the group. Similarity in behavior is driven by the 
actors’ desire to appear appropriate and legitimate within their shared social 
context. 
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At the level of the organizational field, Harrison White was the first to 
conceptualize the argument in his sociology of markets. He defines markets as 
social structures arising among cliques of firms watching one another as they 
position themselves in distinct market niches (White 1981, 2002). The 
organizations in the field or market observe and benchmark against other 
organizations or actors they consider to be their peers (Strang and Tuma 1993). 
As the number of organizations in the same field that adopt a given innovation, 
structure or practice grows; the behavior becomes legitimized (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1993). 
The argument about social cohesion and behavioral similarity can be 
extended to states in the world-polity and world-system (Guler et al. 2002; Polillo 
and Guillen 2005). When two states have intense relationships with one another, 
they are more likely to adopt common patterns of behavior. In particular, the 
intensity of trade transactions indicates the density of the social network in which 
a given country is embedded. To use Durkheim’s terminology, defaulting on 
sovereign debt is conferred with the “sacredness” of group membership. Our 
argument is that countries that exhibit cohesive trade relationships with each 
other are likely to adopt similar patterns of behavior, including the decision to 
default. Sovereign debt crises involve high level of uncertainty; precisely the 
situation in which neo-institutional theory predicts that isomorphic behavior 
driven by social norms will emerge (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). When one state 
13 
 
commits sovereign default, it sets a precedent for others who consider it as a peer 
and have an intense relationship with it. In particular, seeing one country go into 
default in a socially cohesive environment prompts others in the same context to 
ask for similar terms of treatment.  
Examples of this pattern abound. In times of high violent conflict, 
countries might stop servicing their debt, as it happened in the cases of Austria-
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey before World War I, and Italy, Japan, and Turkey 
before World War II. Cohesiveness also takes place among lenders, which 
typically result in formation of associations or institutions that can facilitate 
harmonized behavior among them. In late 19th and early 20th centuries creditors 
lending countries formed their own local associations to take united action 
among debtors. In England, the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 
(CFB) was the major creditor association that acted on behalf of lenders to 
resolve issues of default. Similar institutions were also set up in, France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, and the United States. In late 20th Century “Bank 
Advisory Committee” (BAC) assumed a similar role. Such institutions result in 
cohesive action from creditors and result in similar treatments deemed to be 
legitimate by the world polity to countries perceived to be in similar situations in 
a given time period. For example in the late 19th Century and early 20th Centuries, 
creditors could form administrative units that would assume the public financial 
management of the defaulting countries (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006). In 
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other time periods, countries might be bailed out before they an actual default, 
such as the IMF bailouts of Thailand and South Korea in 1997. Given these 
arguments and historical evidence, we expect that 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for macroeconomic and political-
economic variables, the more a state trades with another state that 
declares sovereign default, the more it is likely to declare sovereign 
default. 
Intense relationships between pairs of countries are one mechanism 
underpinning behavioral similarity. The other key effect identified in the 
literature is structural equivalence. Burt (1987) proposed that individuals and 
organizations occupying the same position in social structure are likely to behave 
similarly. He considered two actors to be in the same position if they are 
structurally equivalent, i.e. they each have the same set of relationships with third 
actors.  
Applying the concept of structural equivalence at the global level runs 
parallel to the tenets of world-system and world-polity theories. Countries in the 
world-system occupy different structural positions, namely, some are 
industrialized core countries and others are peripheral providers of natural 
resources and cheap labor (Wallerstein [1974] 2011). The development of 
industry in the periphery led to the concept of “semi-periphery,” that is, newly-
industrialized countries that are still dependent on core countries for technology 
15 
 
and markets (Guillén 2001). In the world-polity, some countries are more 
frequently sources of cultural models than others, which tend to be recipients 
(Meyer et al. 1997). 
We argue that countries embedded in the same structural position in trade 
networks are more likely to exhibit similar behavior because they face similar 
opportunities and threats. Common relationships puts countries in a situation in 
which they share the same sources of supply and destination markets, even if 
they do not trade with one another, i.e. if their dyadic cohesion is low. Financial 
markets, and especially sovereign debt markets, tend to see structurally 
equivalent countries as similar. In particular, research has shown that crises 
often occur in waves affecting different parts of the world, in a pattern that 
reveals an underlying structure of positional equivalence (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009). For instance, the Asian flu crisis of 1997 spread from Thailand like 
wildfire to other East and South East Asian economies, all of which used local 
labor to make manufactured goods for export to the U.S. and European markets. 
The economies in that part of the world were structurally equivalent, and many 
were driven to situations of near default. We therefore predict that: 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for macroeconomic and political-
economic variables, the more a pair of countries trades with the same 
third countries, the more likely a default in one of them will be 
followed by a default in the other.  
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4. Data 
We have gathered panel data for 70 countries across six continents for the 
years between 1962 and 2009. The sample was mainly based on Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s (2009) compendium and subsequent online updates, from which our 
dependent variables were collected2. The sample is representative of the world 
economy, as it includes both developed and developing economies accounting for 
approximately 95% of global GDP. The sample includes countries with different 
default behavior in the period studied. Not all countries experienced a default or 
near default in this period. Some of these countries have graduated after previous 
experiences; others have never experienced defaults in their history. It should 
also be noted that the panels are not balanced, as the time period we study 
includes two major time periods when the geopolitical landscape changed. The 
late 1960s experienced the wave of decolonization and the late 80s witnessed the 
fall of USSR. In both time periods new countries declared independence. Some of 
these countries are included in our sample, and they are left-censored for all the 
years before their independence. We also treat the Federal Republic of Germany 
before unification as a separate group from Germany so the former is right-
censored after unification and the latter is left-censored before unification.  
5. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our analysis is external sovereign defaults. 
Different financial agencies use varying criteria for categorizing events as a 
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sovereign default (Borensztein and Panizza 2009).  For the purposes of this 
paper, we use Reinhart and Rogoff’s definition, which states that 
...[A] sovereign default is the failure of a government 
to meet a principal or interest payment on the due 
date (or within the grace period). These episodes 
include instances in which rescheduled debt is 
ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than 
the original obligation (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 
11). 
According to this definition, defaults cannot occur in two consecutive 
years. If a state declares sovereign default, a further default in the next year is 
considered as a part of the same sovereign default; however, a second sovereign 
default is possible two years after the first default. Due to this definition of 
sovereign defaults, there are no cases where multiple events occur in a year. 
Sovereign defaults are coded as a binary variable valued as 1 when the country 
declares sovereign default in a given year and as 0 in all other cases. The dataset 
also includes six cases of “near” defaults for hypothetical cases of defaults, which 
were effectively prevented by IMF interventions3. Because our hypothesis about 
trade cohesion considers cohesive behavior among both creditors and debtors, we 
have also created a second variable that includes cases of near default as if they 
were cases of default. 
6. Explanatory Variables 
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World systems theories argue that trade networks play an important role 
in the global social structure and one can understand the world order by 
analyzing these structures (Chase-Dunn 1999; Arrighi 1999). Previous work has 
shown that trade network measures have significant effects in the diffusion of 
institutional standards and behaviors across sovereign states (Guler, Guillén, and 
Macpherson 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005; 
Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009). Following this line of work, we calculated 
trade cohesion in trade and structural equivalence in trade measures regarding 
sovereign defaults. The trade cohesion effect in sovereign defaults measure is the 
explanatory variable we use for testing Hypothesis 1. Building the trade cohesion 
measure requires both data on bilateral trade between countries and data on the 
total trade of a country for each year. We gathered these data from the Correlates 
of War (COW) Project Trade Data Set4. Based on our two dependent variables, we 
built two measures on trade cohesion in trade. First we created a separate 
symmetric bilateral trade matrix of all the countries for each year in our sample. 
Next, absent ties in bilateral trade data were coded as 0 values in these matrices. 
As Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) explain, imputation of missing bilateral 
trade values is problematic. Moreover, as they explain, sometimes trade data is 
purposefully misreported by states. Since our theory is interested in social 
perceptions of the world society, treating non-existing information as 0 is fitting 
because lack of reporting is also a signal. These trade matrices were used for 
building both trade cohesion measures. We created two separate vectors external 
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sovereign defaults. In order to account for the time it might take for the cohesion 
processes to settle we consider a three-year period for countries having a trade 
cohesion effect. The first group of vectors (ESDjt) was coded as 1 if country j has 
declared default at any time between t and t-3. Otherwise they were coded as 0. 
The second group of vectors (ESNDjt) was coded as 1 if country j has declared 
default or experienced a “near” default situation at any time between t and t-3. 
Following the method used by Polillo and Guillén (2005) we have constructed a 
trade cohesion measure for country i at time t as the following: 
(a) For external sovereign defaults only:  
Trade Cohesion Effectit = 𝐸𝑆𝐷!"×! !"#$%!"#!"#$%!" ÷  1000 
(b) For external sovereign defaults and “near” defaults:  
Trade Cohesion Effectit = 𝐸𝑆𝑁𝐷!"×! !"#$%!"#!"#$%!" ÷  1000 
Where Tradeijt is the total trade (sum of imports and exports) between 
country i and country j in year t, and Tradeit is the total trade country i carried 
out with all other countries in year t. The measure is the sum of a focal country’s 
cohesion scores with its defaulting trading partners in a given year. The score 
increases when i and j are stronger trade partners and j is a country that defaults 
in year t and it further increases if i has more strong partners with defaults in a 
given year. In other words, the trade cohesion measure captures the strength of 
trade ties between a focal state and a state that defaults on its debt. Higher 
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scoring states will share a high proportion of their total trade with states that 
declare sovereign default in a given year. States that have no trade ties with a 
defaulting state in a given year will receive 0 as their score that year. The score is 
divided by 1000 for scaling purposes. According to H1, we expect trade cohesion 
to have a significant positive effect on the dependent variable. 
To test hypothesis 2, we constructed a structural equivalence measure that 
accounts for occupying similar positions in the trade network. Using the same 
data from COW Trade Dataset, we calculated the correlation of trade partners for 
all the countries in the network per given year. We then multiplied the correlation 
matrix by ESDjt and ESNDjt vectors for the given year two create the two 
structural equivalence scores: 
(a) For external sovereign defaults only: 
Structural equivalence in trade effectit = 𝐸𝑆𝐷!"× 𝑟(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" ,𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!")!  
(b) For external sovereign defaults and “near” defaults:  
Structural equivalence in trade effectit = 𝐸𝑆𝑁𝐷!"× 𝑟(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" ,𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!")!  
This score increases if the focal state’s volume of trade with partners have 
a high correlation with defaulting states’ volume of trade partners in a given year. 
In other words, states that trade with the same partners in similar volumes get 
higher scores. This score is not bounded and can also be negative if the 
correlations between the types of products between two countries are negative. 
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According to hypothesis 2, we expect structural equivalence in trade to have a 
significant positive effect on sovereign defaults. 
7. Control Variables 
Table I lists the descriptive statistics of the control variables we included 
along with the explanatory variables. To test the effects of democracy, we used 
Polity IV dataset’s polity variable, which is an index of autocracy and democracy 
that ranges between values -10 and 10, where more democratic states get higher 
values and more autocratic states get lower negative values5. Other control 
variables were collected from World Development Indicators dataset from World 
Bank6. We use gross domestic product per capita and terms of trade to control for 
the economic development of the country. Both of these variables are taken from 
WDI. 
Table I - Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sovereign External Defaults 0.029 0.168 0 1 
Sovereign External Defaults and “Near” Defaults 0.031 0.174 0 1 
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults 0.467 5.372 0 108.194 
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults and “Near” 
Defaults 
0.467 5.372 0 108.194 
Structural Equivalence in Trade for Defaults 3.84 3.283 -0.142 17.611 
Structural Equivalence in Trade for Defaults and 
“Near” Defaults 
3.84 3.283 -0.142 17.611 
Polity2 3.57 7.02 -9 10 
GDP Growth (Annual %) 3.791  4.328 -26.479 42.410 
Population Growth (Annual %) 1.608 1.032  -1.723 5.322 
n=2916, 70 countries  
8. Method 
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Our sample consists of unbalanced panel data, where each country is 
observed as a fixed unit annually and our dependent variable is a binary 
categorical variable. All the independent variables are time-dependent variables. 
To test our hypotheses, we used two modeling strategies. Because our dependent 
variable is binary, we used logistic regression models. First, we built two sets of 
logistic regression models using random effects. One set has only sovereign 
defaults as the dependent variable and the other set has sovereign defaults and 
“near” sovereign defaults as the dependent variable. Second, we built two sets of 
logistic regression models using fixed effects with the same sets of dependent 
variables. To build the logistic regression models, letting 𝜋!" be the probability of 
a sovereign default by country i at time t, we set log !!!!!!  equal to a linear 
function of 𝑥 variables, 𝛽𝑥!, where 𝛽𝑥!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!"! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!"#. These models 
allow for easy interpretation of the coefficients. With a simple transformation, 100 𝑒! − 1 , they can be interpreted as percent change in the odds caused by a 1-
unit increase in 𝑥 (Allison 1999).  
We estimate logistic regression models with random effects, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!"!!!!" = 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! , 
where 𝛼! is country-specific factors that do not vary over time. In other 
words, these models assume that the errors based on the individual countries are 
not correlated to specific years in the models and stay stable over the time period 
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under consideration. These models report coefficients based on unit changes in 
the individual country and not the entire population. 
Table II - List of Countries in the Sample 
Algeria* Angola Argentina* 
Australia Austria Belgium 
Bolivia* Brazil* Canada 
Central African Republic* Chile* China 
Colombia Costa Rica* Cote d’Ivoire* 
Denmark Dominican Republic* Ecuador* 
Egypt* El Salvador Finland 
France German Federal Republic Germany 
Ghana* Greece Guatemala* 
Honduras* Hungary Iceland** 
India* Indonesia* Ireland 
Italy Japan Kenya* 
Korea, Republic** Malaysia Mauritius 
Mexico* Morocco* Myanmar* 
Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua* 
Nigeria* Norway Panama* 
Paraguay* Peru* Philippines* 
Poland Portugal Romania* 
Russian Federation* Singapore South Africa* 
Spain Sri Lanka* Sweden 
Switzerland Thailand** Tunisia* 
Turkey* United Kingdom United States 
Uruguay* Venezuela* Zambia* 
Zimbabwe*   
*countries that are included in the subsamples for Table V and VI, **countries that are included 
in the subsample for Table VI.  
We also estimate logistic regression models with fixed effects: 
   𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!"!!!!" = 𝜇! + 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! , 
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where 𝛼! is a fixed constant that may be correlated with the time varying 𝑥. 
Whereas random effects assume the unobserved factors stay stable over time, the 
fixed-effects models assume the errors might be correlated with time. Fixed-
effects models allow the correlation of omitted time-invariant explanatory 
variables with measured explanatory variables, and therefore control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. For our purposes, we expect these models to have a 
better fit because we argue that default behavior might vary in certain periods 
depending on the social conditions of the population. However, any variables that 
do not vary across time or any countries that do not vary in the dependent 
variable across time cannot be included in the analysis. Given that sovereign 
defaults are relatively rare events, and even though we consider a long period of 
time, only a smaller subset of the countries in the sample experience a sovereign 
default. In these fixed effects models, we report results based on the smaller 
subsets of countries that experience a sovereign default between 1962 and 2008 
(Allison 2009). 
We estimated the models using conditional maximum likelihood with 
xtlogit command in STATA. For random effects models we used the re option and 
for fixed effects we used the fe option . In order to control for reverse causation 
all variables are lagged by 1 year.  
9. Results  
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Table II presents the correlation matrix. The Pearson correlations in this 
matrix does not control for random or fixed effects. Tables III and IV present 
logistic regression models with random effects. Finally, Table V and VI present 
the results for the logistic regression models with fixed effects. Coefficients for all 
the models are reported in the form of odds ratios for easier interpretation. Table 
III and V report results using sovereign external defaults as the dependent 
variable, which does not include any cases of “near” defaults. Tables IV and VI 
consider cases of both defaults and “near” defaults. 
Table III - Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
External Sovereign Defaults …        
External Sovereign Defaults 
and “Near” Defaults 0.965* …       
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults -0.015 -0.016       
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults 
and “Near” Defaults -0.015 -0.016 1.000* …     
Structural Equivalence in 
Trade for Defaults 0.16* 0.151* -0.046* -0.046* …    
Structural Equivalence in 
Trade for Defaults and “Near” 
Defaults 
0.16* 0.151* -0.046* -0.046* 1.000* …   
Polity2 -0.071* -0.063* 0.073* 0.073* -0.037* -0.037* …  
GDP Growth (Annual %) -0.109* -0.104* -0.027 -0.027 -0.095* -0.095* -0.159* … 
Population Growth (Annual %) 0.091* 0.088* -0.089* -0.089* 0.108* 0.108* -0.518* 0.153* 
n=1711, 38 countries ; *p<0.05 
Our results lend some support for hypothesis 1 on cohesion among 
borrowers or creditors. The dependent variable including “near” defaults were 
built to capture potential cohesion effects that might happen across creditors that 
could bail out a country before it technically declares sovereign default. In the 
models excluding the cases of “near” defaults, cohesion did not reach 
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significance. However, when the dependent variable included “near” defaults, the 
models with fixed effects support hypothesis 1. This hints that the cohesion 
processes plays a more important role amongst creditors compared to borrowers. 
This supports the historical evidence of creditor associations appearing during 
the time periods that experience high volumes of sovereign defaults 
(Sturzenneger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). 
The regression models lend strong support for hypothesis 2 on structural 
equivalence regardless of the inclusion of “near” defaults in the dependent 
variable. These results give credence to the argument that countries in similar 
structural positions in the network of trade behave similarly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Random-Effects Logistic Regression 
Models for Sovereign External Defaults as the Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
Structural Equivalence in 
Trade for Defaults 
 1.12*** 
(0.028) 
 1.092** 
(0.029) 
1.085** 
(0.029) 
Polity2   0.969 
(0.019) 
0.969 
(0.019) 
0.97 
(0.019) 
GDP Growth  
(Annual %) 
  0.892*** 
(0.019) 
0.904*** 
(0.019) 
0.9*** 
(0.019) 
Population Growth (Annual %)   1.649** 
(0.252) 
1.558** 
(0.233) 
1.557** 
(0.231) 
Year 0.985 
(0.008) 
0.981 
(0.009) 
1.001 
(0.011) 
0.996 
(0.011) 
0.999 
(0.011) 
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Constant 1.31x1011 
(2.21x1012) 
5.13x1014 
(9.69x1015) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
44.359 
(0.897) 
0.130 
(2.863) 
Observations 2916 2916 2916 2916 2916 
No. of Countries 70 70 70 70 70 
Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05 
Table V - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Random Effects Logistic Regression 
Models for Sovereign External Defaults and "Near" Defaults as the Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Cohesion in Trade for 
External Defaults and “Near” 
Defaults 
0.991 
(0.035) 
 0.998 
(0.033) 
 1.000 
(0.033) 
Structural Equivalence in 
Trade for External Defaults 
and “Near” Defaults 
 1.11*** 
(0.028) 
 1.083** 
(0.028) 
1.086** 
(0.028) 
Polity2   0.973 
(0.023) 
0.974 
(0.018) 
0.974 
(0.018) 
GDP Growth (Annual %)   0.899*** 
(0.018) 
0.907*** 
(0.019) 
0.907*** 
(0.019) 
Population Growth (Annual 
%) 
  1.653** 
(0.245) 
1.568** 
(0.224) 
1.568** 
(0.225) 
Year 0.987 
(0.008) 
0.987 
(0.009) 
1.003 
(0.013) 
1.002 
(0.011) 
1.002 
(0.011) 
Constant 3.23x109 
(5.29x1010) 
2.85x109 
(5.13x1010) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Observations 2916 2916 2916 2916 2916 
No. of Countries 70 70 70 70 70 
Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05 
Table VI - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression 
Models for Sovereign External Defaults as the Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Cohesion in Trade for Defaults 0 
(0) 
 0 
(0) 
 0 
(0) 
Structural Equivalence in Trade 
for Defaults 
 1.108*** 
(0.029) 
 1.076* 
(0.03) 
1.071* 
(0.03) 
Polity2   0.971 
(0.024) 
0.978 
(0.024) 
0.978 
(0.024) 
GDP Growth (Annual %)   0.904*** 
(0.019) 
0.913*** 
(0.02) 
0.914*** 
(0.02) 
Population Growth (Annual %)   1.491 
(0.481) 
1.223 
(0.411) 
1.218 
(0.405) 
Year 0.99 
(0.008) 
0.986 
(0.009) 
1.004 
(0.013) 
0.995 
(0.014) 
0.997 
(0.014) 
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Observations 1618 1618 1618 1618 1618 
No. of Countries 36 36 36 36 36 
Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05 
Table VII - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Fixed Effects Logistic Regression 
Models for Sovereign External Defaults and "Near" Defaults 
Independent Variable Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Cohesion in Trade for 
External Defaults and “Near” 
Defaults 
1.430* 
(0.222) 
 1.472* 
(0.242) 
 1.484* 
(0.246) 
Structural Equivalence in 
Trade for External Defaults 
and “Near” Defaults 
 1.094*** 
(0.028) 
 1.061* 
(0.029) 
1.063* 
(0.03) 
Polity2   0.971 
(0.023) 
0.978 
(0.024) 
0.977 
(0.024) 
GDP Growth (Annual %)   0.901*** 
(0.019) 
0.911*** 
(0.02) 
0.910*** 
(0.02) 
Population Growth (Annual 
%) 
  1.654 
(0.532) 
1.37 
(0.443) 
1.407 
(0.468) 
Year 0.991 
(0.008) 
0.992 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.013) 
1.004 
(0.014) 
1.004 
(0.014) 
Observations 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 
No. of Countries 39 39 39 39 39 
Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05 
 
The magnitude of effects for both hypothesized variables are relatively 
high in the models in which they are significant. In Table III, Model 5 includes 
both hypothesized variables along with control variables for the logistic 
regression model with random effects using only sovereign external defaults as 
the dependent variable. This model provides no support for hypothesis 1 but 
confirms hypothesis 2. Structural equivalence is statistically significant at the 
p<0.01 level. For every unit increase in structural equivalence in trade the odds of 
a sovereign default increase by 8.5%. This value corresponds to an increase of 
13.9% in the odds ratio of sovereign defaults for every half standard deviation 
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increase in the structural equivalence in trade score. In Table IV, the same 
method is used for building the models but the dependent variable also includes 
cases of “near” defaults. The results in model 10, which includes all variables, are 
very similar, with a slightly higher coefficient. In this model, for every half 
standard deviation  increase in structural equivalence in trade the odds of a 
sovereign default or a “near” sovereign default increases by 13.6%. Table V and VI 
report on the results for the logistic regression models with fixed effects. 
Hypothesis 2 is supported in all of these models as well. According to Model 15 in 
Table V, for every half standard deviation increase in the structural equivalence 
in trade score, the odds of a sovereign default increase by 11.6%. Table VI reports 
on the dependent variable that includes both sovereign defaults and “near” 
sovereign defaults. In Model 20, the magnitude is slightly lower at an increase of 
10.4% in the odds of a sovereign default or a “near” sovereign default for every 
half standard deviation increase in the structural equivalence in trade score. In 
both models the variable is significant at p<0.05 level.  
All of the results reported above confirm hypothesis 2. Models in Table VI 
also show support for hypothesis 1. In Model 20, the trade cohesion score is 
significant at p<0.05 level with a very high magnitude. For every half standard 
deviation increase in the score the odds of a sovereign default or a “near” 
sovereign default increase by 174%. 
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Among the control variables, GDP growth is the only other variable that is 
significant in all of our models. Population growth was significant in the models 
using random effects but lost its statistical significance in the models using fixed 
effects. Polity2 variable, which controls for democracy was not significant in any 
of our models not supporting some of the previous literature. 
10. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to examine the effects of the position of 
countries in global trade networks on their propensity to declare a sovereign 
default. Using the perspectives of world-system, world-society, and institutional 
theories, we argued that relationships through trade networks result in social 
processes that can affect countries’ financial behavior. Specifically, we posit that 
trade networks generate isomorphic pressures based on social cohesion and 
structural equivalence.  
The empirical results for structural equivalence in trade networks were 
robust across the models. The empirical results regarding high volumes of trade 
leading to cohesion among partners revealed a more complicated process. The 
results hint that repeated interactions are significant when both default and 
“near” default situations are considered. “Near” default situations are the cases 
when the country gets bailed out by creditors or international organizations 
before they declare sovereign default. When a close trade partner commits 
sovereign default or finds itself in a “near” default situation, the focal country also 
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finds itself in a similar situation. The results suggest that creditors observing the 
other partner might step in to rescue other countries they perceive to be in 
similar situations. Nevertheless, policymakers seem to be affected by these 
isomorphic pressures. While the existing literature displays a state-centered 
focus and provides explanations through internal traits of countries, our analysis 
stresses that in an increasingly global economy, where local economies are highly 
connected and dependent on each other, countries are also affected by traits and 
behavior of other countries. A country will not only be affected by changes in its 
own economic and political variables, but also by the changes in other countries. 
Recent analyses in sociology of finance have shown that changes in the 
perception about depreciation of value for certain assets created a domino effect 
of many other similarly positioned assets losing their value. The connectedness of 
these assets through securities played a role in the great recession in 2008 
(Fligstein and Goldstein 2011). Our findings reveal that changes of perception 
might also happen due to changes in trade networks. Trade network measures 
still reveal statistically significant results after controlling for GDP growth, which 
is a robust indicator for sovereign defaults. This is important because changes in 
trade networks might not necessarily be related to changes in the traits of local 
economies or local debt in a country. Nevertheless, due to the socially-
constructed nature of global finance, these changes can still lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies to a country’s default.  
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Another interesting finding in our results is the lack of support for 
democracy having a significant effect on sovereign defaults when trade network 
position is controlled for. Previous theories have argued that democracy plays a 
significant role because of the desire for maintaining political power by local 
actors affect decision making regarding sovereign defaults (Verma 2002). Instead 
we find that perceptions of a country by others might play a more important role 
than the internal decision making. 
One limitation of our study is that the sample includes only relatively large 
economies. While they account for the vast majority of the global economy, many 
small nation-states were left out due to lack of data, especially on trade networks. 
Future research can perhaps compensate for this shortcoming through case 
studies. Research on sovereign defaults can also turn to understanding their 
consequences for economic growth and social stability over the medium and long 
run. Economic sociology can add considerable insight to standard models of 
political and economic development by emphasizing the embeddedness of 
countries in global networks.  
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ARTICLE 2: REVOLUTIONARY WAVES AND INTERNATIONAL 
STRAINS: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE NETWORKS ON 
REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS 
1. Abstract 
If revolutions result from state-breakdowns due to a combination of state-
centered causal mechanisms, why do we also observe international diffusion of 
revolutions in clusters across certain time periods? This paper analyzes the global 
diffusion of revolutionary situations by embedding them in global economy and 
world polity. I expect international strains to be distributed unevenly. Specifically 
role equivalent or structural equivalent countries occupying a similar position in 
the global trade networks, should be affected similarly and experience 
revolutionary situations simultaneously. Countries with cohesion in trade should 
also be affected similarly by international strains due to sharing high cultural 
linkages. I build three measures of interconnectedness based on trade networks 
and use data on revolutionary situations for 69 countries between 1962 and 2009 
and test the hypotheses using logistic regression with random effects and with 
country fixed effects. I find support for hypotheses based on global positions but 
no statistical support is found for the hypothesis based on cohesion. 
39 
 
2. Introduction 
On December 18th, 2010, the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of 
Tunisia started a wave of uprisings that since came to be known as the “Arab 
Spring.” Within eight months the governments were also overthrown in Egypt, 
Yemen, and Libya, and protests spread to fifteen more countries. The Arab 
Spring represents the most recent example in the phenomena of revolutionary 
waves following the likes of the Atlantic revolutions at the end of 18th century, the 
revolutions of 1848, and the revolutions of 1989. The phenomenon that 
revolutions tend to cluster across time is well documented in the literature (Tilly 
1996; Goldstone 2001; Beck 2011). It is also documented as an expectation of 
revolutionaries, who believe others share their local causes against their relevant 
states. This notion was apparent as early as 1906 when Trotsky was reflecting on 
the 1905 first workers’ revolution in Russia in Results and Prospects (1906) when 
he expected other parts of Europe to experience similar revolutions following the 
Russian experience.  
While revolutionary waves are a common observation, existing literature 
finds that domestic factors play a highly significant role in leading to revolutions. 
Accumulated research over decades concludes that state breakdowns lead to 
revolutions. In other words, revolutions do not cause state-breakdowns, but 
follow them. Therefore, the mechanisms leading to revolutions are closely related 
to strains on the state structure. State-breakdowns tend to happen when a 
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combination of mechanisms takes place simultaneously. Such interactions do not 
frequently occur and this is one of the reasons why revolutions tend to be rare 
events (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991, 2001; Collins 1999; Goodwin 2001).  
While the significance of international factors are generally recognized by 
the theories of revolutions, there is not a common agreement on the degree of 
their significance and how they affect revolutions. Studies stress the importance 
of domestic variables, but not all of the research in the literature pays significant 
attention to the international variables. Moreover, the research that considers the 
international dimension can still have weaknesses due to leaving international 
factors out of the causal analysis or creating an analytical bifurcation between the 
domestic and international (Lawson 2015, Go 2014). This leads to a theoretical 
puzzle in the literature given the observation of revolutionary waves: If 
revolutions result from state-breakdowns due to a combination of state-centered 
causal mechanisms, why do we also observe international diffusion of revolutions 
in clusters across certain time periods?  
This paper improves the existing literature by analyzing the embeddedness 
of states in global economy and world polity. My analysis adds to the existing 
literature in two ways. First, by accounting for all the multilateral relationships 
between states across the period of investigation, I control for significant 
relationships that might go unnoticed. Most research on revolutions relies on in 
depth explanations of case studies, which provide robust explanations for the 
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causes in the particular cases under investigation. While such analyses allows the 
researchers to account for domestic developments for the focal country and most 
of the cross national relationships the focal country has with significant others in 
great depth, it is not possible to account for all the developments in the 
international developments in equal scrutiny. Moreover, it might be hard to 
pinpoint significant international developments among the extremely great 
number of international relationships that continue to change dynamically across 
time. This is especially the case if the important relationship is one that does not 
include the country in focus. For example, Lawson (2015) claims Haitian 
Revolution in late 18th Century played a significant role by leaving a significant 
legacy to provide world cultural scripts for later uprisings in the international 
order. By analyzing the measures of interconnectedness based on all the 
multilateral relationships of the countries in the population, I can account for 
important relationships that might not appear as such in the a priori analysis, but 
still keep the analysis on state level to study both domestic and international 
strains simultaneously. 
A second important contribution of this study to the literature on 
revolutions is to control for multiple types of international strains simultaneously 
to estimate their relative importance. Because of the aforementioned problems 
regarding difficulties on in-depth analyses of cross-national processes, it is 
difficult to study multiple types of international strains simultaneously. This has 
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lead to reducing international strains to certain significant events, such as defeat 
in war. In this paper, I develop three hypotheses derived from theories of 
revolutions and global level world polity theory. The hypotheses are based on 
previous works that find world-systemic openings, dependency, and world 
cultural linkages to be significant international strains on the state structure. By 
including the explanatory variables simultaneously in the models, comparison on 
the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects can be made.  
A more general contribution of this paper is to reveal that processes of 
diffusion that were generally associated with business outcomes in economic 
sociology and organization theory can also be observed for political crises of state. 
This echoes recent collaborations in the social movements and organization 
theory literature’s claims on the relatedness of the theories in the two fields 
(Davis et al. 2005). 
 To test the hypothesis derived from research in state-centered theories of 
revolutions, I build three measures of interconnectedness in trade networks for a 
sample of 69 countries for the period between 1962 and 2009. These measures 
focus on positions of countries in the global space across different relative 
dimensions across time. Two of the measures focus on positioning in the global 
trade and another measure focuses on the strength of trade ties between trade 
partners. I argue that increased structural and role equivalence in the trade 
networks will lead to similar fiscal strains in the state power. I also argue that 
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trading in higher volumes with each other might lead to higher fiscal strains 
when one of the cohesive partners experience a revolutionary situation.  
Two sets of models logistic regression models are built for panel data, with 
one set controlling for random effects and the other set controlling for fixed 
effects. Both sets of models reveal similar results and support the hypotheses on 
the significance of position in global trade networks. The hypothesis based on 
cohesive partners is not supported. 
3. Interstate Relationships and Revolutions 
The importance of interstate relationships has long been recognized in the 
theories of revolutions since the third generation of revolutionary theories since 
Skocpol (1979)’s seminal work on revolutions stresses the importance of 
transnational relationships in studying revolutions. Specifically, she argues that 
world historical time and positions in the international arenas play a significant 
role in causing revolutions. Improving on the mechanisms underlying 
international processes, Collins (1999) identifies interstate power-prestige as a 
significant factor in Geopolitical Theory. He argues that interstate power-
prestige, which is closely affected by geopolitical conditions, is directly linked to 
the legitimacy of rulers and ruling institutions. Significant loss of legitimacy by 
the rulers is argued to potentially lead to revolutions. In these theories military 
conflict is identified as the main international strain affecting revolutions. 
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More recent research continues to signify international strains. Dependent 
development and world-systemic openings are one of the necessary conditions 
leading to revolutions in the Third World in Foran (2005)’s model. Potential 
world-systemic openings occur when the status quo between core and periphery 
states experience major developments. Perceptions of other countries on the 
revolutions in the focal country are also important. International relations play a 
significant role and revolutionary trajectories might change based on foreign 
support or resistance (Goldstone 2014). The global position of foreign support or 
resistance might also play an important role, as revolutionary intellectuals 
supported by Great Powers might increase likeliness of successful revolutionary 
outcomes (Kurzman 2008).  
Despite the recognition of the international mechanisms and inclusion of 
the global level in the models, Lawson (2015) argues that in analyses there is a 
tendency to reduce international processes to limited number of factors; such as 
Skocpol’s reduction of international conjecture to defeat in war, or to refrain from 
including the international in the causal processes altogether. He reiterates Go 
(2014)’s argument that this results to analytical bifurcation, possibly due to 
methodological preferences. These criticisms point toward a gap in the research, 
rather than fundamental problems in the existing research. As the preferred 
methodology of research in revolutions is based on case studies, a common 
strategy is to focus on a certain world historical time or geography. For example 
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Skocpol (1979) explicitly stresses the importance of world historical time for the 
particular international strains being incurred by the cases under review, but 
makes an analyses based a frozen world historical time period. Foran (2005)’s 
model limits the geography of the cases to third world countries and conditions 
such as dependent development apply to the selected sample. This condition is 
not necessarily contradicted by revolutions that take place in core countries. By 
freezing the time period or focusing on a certain position in the global space, 
researchers can focus on the causal factors that play a significant role in their 
cases. This allows for building robust models for the relevant cases; however, also 
results in limiting variance in the international developments. 
Moreover, it should be recognized that holding positions or world-
historical time constant allows the analyses to be fairly controlled against changes 
in the bilateral relationships between third parties. For example, the 
international Great Powers identified by Kurzman (2008) are significant actors in 
the 1905-1915 period, but in other periods other states might replace them due to 
relationships that take place without the focal states participation. As analyses 
focusing on longer time periods or higher levels reveal, world hegemons change 
over long centuries (Arrighi 2010). This does not necessarily contradict 
Kurzman’s findings or create problem for his model, but points to places, where 
we can improve our understanding of international processes.  
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When the existing research in the literature is compared to each other, the 
effects of international strains are observed as varying across different time 
periods and different dimensions. For example, contrasted to Foran’s conclusion 
that dependent development is a necessary condition for revolutions in third 
world countries, Wallerstein (2011)’s argument that French Revolution in 1789 
happened precisely because it was a country positioned in the core of the world 
system might seem as two conflicting theories. Yet, in fact it reveals that 
international strains are not evenly distributed across the global space and 
dynamically vary across time and positions. 
To improve upon the existing understanding of international effects on 
revolutions, one should consider both dynamic changes in the international 
strains across time and different positions while still accounting for domestic 
strains. In order to capture these dynamic changes; one should also take into 
account the international developments that take place without the participation 
of the focal state. One promising way of achieving this goal is focusing on all the 
bilateral relationships between the international actors by borrowing methods 
and concepts from social network theory. As such, instead of limiting the focus to 
only the relationships that include the focal state and significant others. Focusing 
on multilateral relationships comprehensively can increase the power of analyses. 
Taking these considerations in the account, three major inferences can be 
derived from the existing models regarding the significant effects of international 
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level strains. A commonly stressed international factor that plays an important 
role in revolutionary theories is the global positioning. Whether treated as world-
systemic openings or placement relative to the international power structure, 
global positioning is included in the models. As explained above, global positions 
are not affected evenly across different positions or time. In order to analyze 
dynamic changes in the global positioning, social network theory provides 
valuable tools and methods. By focusing on the set of relationships between 
actors, one can determine their positioning.  
According to world system theories, the global positioning of a country is 
determined by its trade relationships (Wallerstein [1974] 2011). To determine the 
placement of the countries and their dynamic changes over time, one can utilize 
Burt (1987)’s concept of structural equivalence. Structural equivalence is 
determined by the sets of relationships that actors have with third parties. Two 
actors are structurally equivalent if they possess the same sets of relationships 
with the third party actors. Because world systemic position is mainly determined 
by trade relationships, one can expect states with similar sets of trade 
relationships to incur similar international strains, which might lead to 
revolutionary situations. If two states are positioned similarly in the world 
system, they are more likely to be influenced by similar world-system openings. 
Thus, I predict that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Controlling for domestic strains, the more 
similarity between the sets of trade relationships of two countries are, 
the more likely a revolutionary situation in one of them will be 
followed by the other. 
 
Sharing the same sets of relationships with third parties is one mechanism 
that creates an equivalent position to identify states with a similar distribution of 
international strains. Another type of equivalent position is due to sharing similar 
types of relations. Role equivalence considers similarity in the types of 
relationships carried out by actors in the network, as opposed to the similarity in 
the sets of relationships. By considering the role equivalency of two states, one 
can account for comparison across different populations (Winship and Mandel, 
1984). Regarding the analyses of revolutionary situations, accounting for role 
equivalence might play an important role in the cases, when states engage in 
similar type of relationships across core and periphery but with varying 
countries. For instance the International Powers might have a similar perception 
on a certain type of states specializing in the trade of certain products. The 
revolutionaries in these states might receive foreign support but the actual actors 
sending the support might differ. This might be due to historical reasons or 
territorial differences.  
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For example Kurzman (2008) displays the importance of Great Powers in 
the cases under investigation, but the Great Power making a significant effect is 
not necessarily the same country for each case.  
In such cases, when structural equivalency fails to capture these effects, 
they can still be captured by role equivalence.  Thus, following with the 
arguments iterated above, one should expect the type of trade being engaged in to 
have a significant affect in the distribution of international strains. Therefore, I 
expect: 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for domestic strains, the more similar 
the type of products traded by two countries are, the more likely a 
revolutionary situation in one of them will be followed by the other. 
 
Aside from global positioning, a second type of international causal factor 
commonly identified in the literature on revolutions refers to the world cultural 
linkages between countries. At the global level, Beck (2011) demonstrates 
correlations between the expansion of world cultural linkages and revolutionary 
waves even when controlled for hegemonic periods and hegemonic wars, which 
do not reveal statistically significant coefficients in the models. He cites the 
importance of global scripts distributed across the world society and argues that 
the expansion of world cultural linkages play a significant role in revolutionary 
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waves which are “events of an entire international system” and “cultural events” 
(p. 193). At this level of analyses, how the international strains are distributed 
internationally is not specified. 
Analyses at lower level hints at why the distribution might be uneven. 
Tarrow (2012) stresses the importance of transnational activists whose numbers 
have increased over the years. He identifies this as “a diffusing phenomenon” 
mainly from industrialized world to industrializing (187). Selbin (2010) stresses 
the importance of available scripts at the individual level echoing Beck’s findings 
at the global level and demonstrates the power of stories that can be adapted and 
distributed by revolutionaries. He argues that the distribution happens based on 
familiarity and states “(w)e like our stories familiar” (67), to explain that stories 
result in mimesis not just due to mimicking or passive contagion, but through 
active engagement of individuals, where they also strive to rise to the occasions 
told by the stories. Stories of success from revolutionaries in other countries 
might become inspirational. 
Other work on world cultural linkages also reveal that diffusion processes 
are not distributed across the globe evenly (Beckfield, 2010) and confirm that 
diffusion of global processes are more likely to diffuse across cohesive trade 
partners (Polillo and Guillén 2005; Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 2005). As such, 
cohesive partners are those who trade in greater volumes with each and this is 
akin to Selbin’s notion of familiarity at a higher level. Thus, if world cultural 
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linkages are indeed increasing international strains upon the domestic state 
structures, they are more likely to be distributed similarly among cohesive trade 
partners. This could be due to mimesis happening through higher frequency of 
relationships between actors through trade interactions. Thus, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 3: Controlling for domestic strains, the more a state 
trades with another country experiencing a revolutionary situation, 
the more it is likely to have a revolutionary situation 
4. Data 
I have collected variables at the state-level from various international 
time-series datasets to create panel data for 69 countries across six continents 
between the years 1962 to 2009. The sample selection is based on Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s collected sample and is representative of the global economy as it 
represents 95% of the world GDP. Because the time period includes close to half a 
century, not all the countries in the sample exist in each year of the investigation. 
The countries, which do not exist or do not participate in international trade in 
the beginning of the sample, are left censored until they become independent 
states or start participating in international trade. The only country that is right-
censored in the dataset is German Federal Republic as it is treated as a separate 
country from Germany after the unification. The mean GDP per capita of this 
sample across all years is $7433 in Constant USD for the year 2000. Using this 
sample, I have built trade network matrices for each year to calculate the 
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explanatory measures. In the models that use fixed effects, variables that do not 
vary in the dependent variable drop from the models. In other words, if a country 
does not experience any revolutionary situation between 1962 and 2009 they are 
dropped from the models. For this sample only 48 out of the 69 countries 
experience at least one revolutionary situation between 1962 and 2009. The fixed 
effects models report on this smaller sample. The mean GDP per capita for this 
smaller sample is $3215. The significant difference between the means of the two 
samples further support existing literature from both state-centered and world 
systems theories that economic causes are significant in leading to revolutionary 
situations.  
While it would be more ideal to include a longer time frame with a larger 
sample of countries, the sample is mainly restricted by data limitations. As it will 
be detailed below, one of the explanatory variables is based on the Standardized 
International Trade Codes, which were first reported by UN in 1962, disallowing 
one to build the measure with as much detail and precision on the types of 
relationships as required for the earlier years. While it would have been ideal to 
include all the countries that participate in international trade, the quality of the 
data decreases when countries with smaller populations or GDPs are added to the 
sample.  
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5. Dependent Variable 
As discussed above, one of the key findings of state-centered theories of 
revolutions is that state breakdowns are a pre-condition for revolutions. In other 
words, revolutions do not break states but state breakdowns may lead to 
revolutions (Goldstone 1993).  Therefore, successful revolutions are the outcome 
of a series of mechanisms that lead to increased strains on the state structure. 
Thus, focusing at the state-level instead of a more macro level, such as 
revolutionary waves is more informative. State-level analysis coupled with an 
accounting for potential relationships also allows for identifying connections 
between revolutions that might not appear immediately.  
When the goal is to identify the significance of international strains in 
revolutionary waves, considering revolutionary situations instead of successful 
revolutionary results is more fitting. Limiting the analysis to only successful cases 
might result in dropping some important cases from the analyses (Beck 2011). 
For example, most recently, Arab Spring has affected an entire region but has 
resulted in successful revolutions in only a fraction of the cases. This should not 
necessarily be interpreted as unsuccessful cases not being affected by 
international strains.. For this paper I follow Beck (2011)’s lead to separate 
revolutionary onsets from revolutionary outcomes and focusing on the former 
when studying the revolutionary waves. I will utilize the former for the dependent 
variable. 
54 
 
There is also another important reason for not limiting the dependent 
variable to successful revolutions and focusing on the onset of revolutions 
instead: Considering only the successful cases might undermine the international 
effects of the whole revolutionary wave. World-Systemic openings or cultural 
linkages might cause significant international strains, but might not interact with 
other domestic strains. For example, the process of mimesis happening through 
stories argued by Selbin (2010) does not need to be stories of successful 
revolutions: they can also be about the promise of revolution. When multiple 
countries are affected by world-systemic openings or cultural linkages but only a 
handful of them experience successful revolutionary outcomes, it might be harder 
to identify what type of international strain was significantly at play. Considering 
all revolutionary onsets in the analyses might overcome this problem. Therefore, 
for the analyses below, I control for revolutionary situations as the dependent 
variable. 
To build a dependent variable that accounts for whether a country 
experiences a revolutionary situation in a given year or not, Revolutions 
(domestic 7) variable was collected as the dependent variable from Banks’ Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2010), where events are defined as 
“[a]ny illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a 
change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is 
independence from the central government.” Revolutions (domestic7) is a count 
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variable that reports on the number of events for any given year at the state level. 
For this sample, there are 524 cases of revolutionary situations experienced by 48 
countries (Figure 1). I have then created a dummy variable based on the domestic 
7 data to account for whether a country has experienced a revolutionary situation 
in a given year or not1. This dummy variable, revolutionary situations, is utilized 
as the dependent variable in the models. 
 
 
Figure II - Revolutionary Situations Since 1963 
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6. Explanatory Variable 
Echoing the world-systemic and world cultural approaches, previous 
literature analyzing global diffusion of processes, institutions, and practices have 
identified trade network measures to play a significant role (Guler, Guillén, and 
Macpherson 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005; 
Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009). Based on the lead of this line of work, I 
have built structural equivalence in trade, role equivalence in trade, and cohesion 
in trade measures to test the three hypotheses. The trade data for structural 
equivalence and trade cohesion measure was collected from Correlates of War 
(COW)2 Project Trade Data Set and the trade data with the required Standardized 
International Trade Codes was collected from two separate sources. For the years 
between 1962 and 2000, I used Feenstra et al. (2005)’s World Trade Flows: 1962-
2000 Dataset. For the years between 2000 and 2009, I have relied on United 
Nations COMTRADE Database. For the earlier years, the former dataset provides 
a more reliable alternative to COMTRADE as the dataset includes multiple 
sources including but not limited to UN COMTRADE.  Three explanatory 
variables are used for testing the international strains identified in the three 
hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis is tested by structural equivalence in trade variable. I 
built this variable to account for the occupancy of similar positions in the trade 
network. This measure relies on correlations of the sets of trade partners between 
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two countries in a given year while also taking the volume of trade in each sets in 
account. A hypothetical perfect correlation would happen if two countries were to 
trade in the same volume of products with the same set of countries in a given 
year. This measure increases for a country if it occupies a similar position with 
other countries that experience a revolutionary situation in a given year. To 
calculate the measure, first I built a separate symmetric bilateral trade matrix for 
each year. Missing ties were coded as 0 and were treated as absent ties. 
Imputation of missing bilateral trade values is problematic, especially for cases 
regarding international conflict or sovereign crises (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 
2009). These bilateral trade matrices were used for both this measure and the 
cohesion in trade measure. After the matrices were built, the correlation matrix 
of trade partners for each country was calculated. Then, a vector of revolutionary 
situations (𝑅𝑆!") for each year was created. These vectors, which were used in the 
construction of each explanatory variable, were coded as the number of 
revolutionary situations a country experienced in a given year and coded as 0 if 
otherwise. Finally, the correlation matrices was multiplied by the RSjt 
(Revolutionary Situations) vectors for the given year to attain the measure: 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡!" =  𝑅𝑆!"×𝓇(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" ,𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!")! , 
where i and j are the countries in a trade relationship and t is time. 
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This score is not bounded and can be either positive or negative. The score 
increases if a focal country is has higher structural equivalence with other 
countries that experience a revolutionary situation. It also is susceptible to the 
number of revolutionary situations in the given year. If structurally equivalent 
countries are experiencing multiple revolutionary situations in the give year this 
also adds to the score. According to hypothesis 1, structural equivalence in trade 
effect is expected to have a significant effect with a positive magnitude on the 
probability of a revolutionary situation taking place in a given year. 
For the second hypothesis, I calculated a Role Equivalence for 
Revolutionary Situations in Trade measure, which is adapted from the previously 
used Role Equivalence in Trade measures in literature. This measure was initially 
conceptualized by Winship and Mandel (1984) and later realized by Guler et al 
(2002). It considers the similarities of the types of products that are traded by the 
countries in the sample to account for the similarities in their trade structures. 
This requires data on the types of product that are traded by each country in the 
sample. The operationalization is carried out by utilizing The Standardized 
International Trade Codes (SITC), which are reported by the United Nations 
Statistics division. Since the implementation of SITC began only in 1962, this 
measure cannot be built for earlier dates and limits the earliest date of data 
available for the sample to 1962. The Standardized International Trade Codes go 
from general to specific as the number of digits in a code increases. The single 
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digit codes are the most general ones. The two digit codes are subgroups of single 
digits and three digit codes are subgroups of two digit codes. For example, SITC 0 
is “food and live animals.” SITC 01 is “meat and meat preparations.” SITC 011 is 
“meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen.” The measure is built using the 
2-digit level codes, which are neither too specific nor too general.  
To build the measure, I have collected the relevant SITC data from two 
separate sources. For the years between 2000 and 2008, I have relied on United 
Nations COMTRADE Database. For the years between 1962 and 2000, I used 
Feenstra et al. (2005)’s World Trade Flows: 1962-2000 Dataset. For the earlier 
years, Feenstra et al.’s dataset provides a more reliable alternative to 
COMTRADE, as the dataset includes multiple sources including but not limited 
to UN COMTRADE. The World Trade Flows: 1962-2000 Dataset only reports 4-
digit SITC codes, so to build the network measure, I have collapsed them into 2-
digit product categories. I have collected the data from UN COMTRADE at 2-digit 
product level. Then I followed the procedure used by Polillo and Guillén (2005). 
First I constructed an export product category share vector (EPSV) and an import 
product category share vector (IPSV) for each country i and year t: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑉!" = !"#$%&'!"#!"#$%&'!"#! , 
 𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑉!" =  !"#$%&'!"#!"#$%&'!"#! , 
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where 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!"# is the value of exports in dollars for country i in year t for 
product k, and 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!"# is the value of imports in dollars for country i in year t 
for product k. Then for each given year, I stacked these two vectors together, to 
form a product category share vector, 𝑃𝑆𝑉!". Finally, I calculated my measure of 
role equivalence in trade with the following equation: 
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" =  𝑅𝑆!" × 𝑟(𝑃𝑆𝑉!" ,𝑃𝑆𝑉!")! , 
where r is the Pearson correlation coefficient between product share 
vectors, PSVs, for states i and j during year t; RS equals the number of 
revolutionary situations state j has in year t. This score increases if the focal 
state’s product share vector has a high correlation with revolutionary states’ 
product share vectors in a given year. If a state’s product share vectors are highly 
positively correlated with states that experience revolutionary situations in a 
given year, the score will increase. This score is not bounded and can also be 
negative if the correlations between the types of products of two countries are 
negative.  
The objective in using this measure is creating a score based on a bimodal 
social network. For a given year r(PSVit, PSVjt), creates a matrix that determines 
the location of each country in the role equivalence in trade dimension of global 
space. RSjt identifies the countries that experienced a revolutionary situation in 
the given year. The score is then calculated upon a focal state’s distance to 
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number of revolutions that took place in that given year. According to hypothesis 
2, I expect role equivalence in trade to have a significant positive effect on the 
number of revolutions in the focal state in a given year. 
Finally, to test hypothesis 3, I have built cohesion in trade measure. This 
measure considers the share of a focal country’s trade with another country so it 
requires both bilateral trade data and total trade data, which COW Data Set 
provides. The values in the trade matrices were then divided by the total trade in 
each country to create a matrix that reports on share of a focal country’s trade 
with another compared to its total trade. This new matrix was then multiplied 
with the 𝑅𝑆!"vector for the given year as the following: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡!" = 𝑅𝑆!"! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"#𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"  
where, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"#, refers to sum of bilateral trade between country i and j in 
year t, and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" refers to the total trade country i engaged in with all other 
countries in year t. As with the other measures, trade cohesion effect considers 
the sum of a foal countries cohesion scores with all other countries that 
experience a revolutionary situation in the give year. A country gets higher scores 
if cohesive trade partners experience more number of revolutionary situations in 
the given year. If a country has no cohesive partners experiencing a revolutionary 
situation, then the score is 0. According to hypothesis 3, this measure should 
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have a statistically significant effect with a positive magnitude on the dependent 
variable. 
 
7. Other Variables 
To control for domestic strains, I introduce state-level controls identified 
by Goldstone (1993) and build multivariate models. I have collected annual 
population growth and annual GDP growth variables from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Dataset3. These variables report the percentage change from 
the values in the previous year. In order to control for economic strain, I have 
collected the crisis_tally variable from Reinhart and Rogoff’s Varieties Dataset 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2013). This dataset provides an exhaustive list of various 
economic crises experienced by states between 1800 and 2010. The crisis_tally 
variable is a count variable based upon the total count of banking crises, currency 
crashes, sovereign domestic and external debt crises, inflation crises, or stock 
market crashes a state has experienced in a given year. To control for 
international warfare, I have collected the Interstate Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (inttot) variable from Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2008 
Dataset (Marshall, n.d.)4. This variable represents a magnitude score summed 
from interstate violence and interstate war happening in a state. It excludes any 
war or violence due to non-independent state or groups and is fitting to control 
for international strains due to interstate wars. A time trend (calendar year) is 
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also included in all the models. Table VIII lists the descriptive statistics of the 
control variables along with the explanatory variables. 
 
Table VIII - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Revolutionary Situations 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Revolutions (domestic7) 0.186 0.51 0 9 
Structural Equivalence in Trade 6.408 3.403 -0.412 23.846 
Role Equivalence in Trade  3.551 2.001 -0.074 13.614 
Trade Cohesion 0.586 18.936 0 913.468 
GDP Growth (Annual %) 3.865 4.238 -26.479 42.410 
Interstate Major Episodes of Violence (inttot) 0.052 0.342 0 4 
Crisis Tally 0.937 1.17 0 7 
Population Growth (Annual %) 1.618 1.046 -4.529 5.322 
n=2821, 69 Countries 
8. Method 
The dependent variable is a binary categorical variable. This violates the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and uncorrelated error terms for ordinary least 
squares regression. While Poisson regression is applicable for violation of these 
assumptions, the dependent variable is also overdispersed, as its mean is not 
equal to its variance. For such a dependent variable, logistic regression model fits 
better (Allison 2009).  
For 𝜋!" as the probability of a revolutionary situation by country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 
I built logistic regression models setting 𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!!!!!  equal to linear function of 𝑥 
variables, 𝛽𝑥!, where 𝛽𝑥!" =  𝛽𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!"! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!"#. Easy interpretation of 
these coefficients  as a percent change in the odds caused by a 1-unit increase in 𝑥 
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is allowed by the transformation, 100 𝑒! − 1  (Allison 1999). I have built two sets 
of models. The first one estimates logistic regression models with random effects, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!"!!!!" = 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! , 
built by using xtlogit command with the re option. Here 𝛼! is country-
specific factors that do not vary over time. These models assume that errors 
based on individual countries are stable over the time period of analysis. I also 
built logistic regression models with fixed effects, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!"!!!!" = 𝜇! + 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! , 
 built by using xtlogit command in STATA with the fe option. Here 𝛼! may 
be correlated with time varying 𝑥.  
The former models are built with the assumption unobserved factors stay 
stable over time and correct against inefficiency, whereas the latter models 
correct against spuriousness by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Controlling for the unobserved variables that do not change over time is valuable 
when analyzing revolutionary waves, as many variables that are traditionally of 
interest but hard to be observed can be accounted for. For example, in this 
sample only independent states are considered, and as such, fixed effects allows 
for controlling for whether a country has a colonial past or not. Similarly, using 
fixed effects also controls for the geographies of the states that do not change over 
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this period. While controlling for unobserved heterogeneity adds to the power of 
the analyses, fixed effects models can only include variables that vary in the 
group over the period of observation. This also applies to the dependent variable. 
Therefore, introducing fixed effects results in the groups, which do not 
experience a revolutionary situation in the period studied, to drop from the 
analyses. After introducing the fixed effects, 48 countries remain in the models.  
Random effects models are expected to fit better if 𝛼!" is not correlated 
with the 𝑥. For the purposes of this paper, fixed effects models are likely to be a 
better fit, as based on the literature, the effects due to global population is 
expected to change over time. Nevertheless, the random effects models including 
all the countries are reported first in the paper to check for any significant 
changes in the results due to the loss a subset of countries with a significantly 
higher GDP per capita average. In order to control for reverse causation all 
variables are lagged by 1 year. 
9. Results 
Table X reports the correlation matrix of the variables for the sample. The 
results in this table are the correlations before controls for panel data. Table XI 
reports the results of the logistic regression models with random effects using 
incidence rate ratios for easier interpretations. Finally, Table XII reports the 
results of logistic regression models with fixed effects.  
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The results reveal some support for hypothesis 1, strong support for 
hypothesis 2, and no support for hypothesis 3. This seems to support theories 
based on structural positions, compared to the hypotheses derived from world 
cultural linkages arguments; however, some caution should be taken before 
drawing strong conclusions, which will be discussed in the final section of the 
paper. 
Table IX - Countries in the Sample 
Algeria* Angola* Argentina* 
Australia Austria Belgium 
Bolivia* Brazil* Canada 
Central African Republic* Chile* China* 
Colombia Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire* 
Denmark Dominican Republic* Ecuador* 
Egypt* El Salvador* Finland 
France German Federal Republic* Germany 
Ghana* Greece* Guatemala* 
Honduras* Hungary* India* 
Indonesia* Ireland Italy* 
Japan Kenya* Korea, Republic* 
Malaysia* Mauritius Mexico* 
Morocco* Myanmar* Netherlands 
New Zealand Nicaragua* Nigeria* 
Norway Panama* Paraguay* 
Peru* Philippines* Poland 
Portugal* Romania* Russian Federation* 
Singapore South Africa* Spain* 
Sri Lanka* Sweden Switzerland 
Thailand* Tunisia* Turkey* 
United Kingdom* United States Uruguay 
Venezuela* Zambia* Zimbabwe* 
*countries included in the models for Table XI 
Table X - Pairwise Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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1.Revolutionary Situations …       
2.Structural Equivalence in 
Trade 
0.217* …      
3.Role Equivalence in Trade  0.217* 0.576* …     
4.Trade Cohesion -0.006 -0.026 -0.013 …    
5.GDP Growth (Annual %) -0.081* 0.020 0.076* -0.018* …   
6.Interstate Major Episodes 
of Violence (inttot) 
0.014 -0.073* -0.062* 0.01 -0.003 …  
7.Crisis Tally 0.130* 0.194* 0.126* -0.008 -0.260* -0.031 … 
8.Population Growth 
(Annual %) 
0.114* 0.067* -0.153* -0.013 0.160* 0.026 0.073* 
 n=2795, 69 countries; *p<0.05 
The results of the models built with random effects are very similar to the 
models built with fixed effects. For the explanatory variables, the statistical 
significances are at the same level and the magnitudes of the variables are in the 
same direction for each corresponding model. There are minute differences in the 
strength of the magnitude in the models, but this is almost negligible. For the 
control variables, there is some variance in the level of significances, but the 
significant variables in first set of models are still significant in the second set of 
models except the constant variable for the annual population growth. However, 
the interaction variable for population growth is still significant in the fixed 
effects models revealing a significant effect in the expected direction. This 
similarity in the two sets of models, adds further confidence to the robustness of 
the results. As the models with fixed effects are expected to be a better fit, only 
the results of Table XI are interpreted below due to space constraints. 
It is worth noting that Role Equivalence in Trade is statistically significant 
at p<0.001 level in all of the models in which it is included and reveals results in 
the expected direction. Contrary to the constant significance of Role Equivalence 
in Trade, Trade Cohesion does not reach statistical significance in any of the 
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models it is included in. Structural Equivalence in Trade is significant in all the 
models that exclude Role Equivalence in Trade. 
 
Table XI - Panel Random Effects Logistic Regression Models for Revolutionary 
Situations 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Structural 
Equivalence in Trade 
1.091*** 
(0.020) 
  1.082*** 
(0.021) 
  1.013 
(0.027) 
Role Equivalence in 
Trade 
 1.229*** 
(0.042) 
  1.209*** 
(0.042) 
 1.189*** 
(0.059) 
Trade Cohesion   1.003 
(0.004) 
  1.003 
(0.004) 
1.002 
(0.004) 
GDP Growth 
(Annual %) 
   0.936*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.939*** 
(0.014) 
0.938*** 
(0.014) 
0.939*** 
(0.014) 
Interstate Major 
Episodes of Violence 
(inttot) 
   1.587* 
0.283 
1.628** 
(0.293) 
1.544* 
(0.274) 
1.631** 
(0.293) 
Crisis Tally    1.045 
(0.058) 
1.059 
(0.058) 
1.080 
(0.059) 
1.055 
(0.059) 
Population Growth 
(Annual %) 
   3.651*** 
(1.311) 
3.583*** 
(1.287) 
3.927*** 
(1.406) 
3.566*** 
(1.283) 
[Population Growth 
(Annual %)]2 
   0.689*** 
(0.062) 
0.698*** 
(0.062) 
0.675*** 
(0.060) 
0.698*** 
(0.062) 
Calendar year 1.008 
(0.005) 
1.000 
(0.005) 
1.014 
(0.005) 
1.001 
(0.007) 
0.995 
(0.007) 
1.006 
(0.007) 
0.995 
(0.007) 
Constant 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.146) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.088) 
345.886 
(4811.055) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
283.535 
(3946.963
) 
Log likelihood -992.385 -985.073 -
1003.372 
-963.866 -957.761 -972.391 -957.501 
n 2821 2821 2821 2821 2821 2821 2821 
Number of Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
NOTE – Coefficients are reported as odds ratios; standard errors are reported in parentheses; 
all independent variables are measured with a one-year lag; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Table XII - Panel Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Models for Revolutionary 
Situations 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Structural 
Equivalence in Trade 
1.082*** 
(0.020) 
  1.076*** 
(0.021) 
  1.000 
(0.027) 
Role Equivalence in 
Trade 
 1.228*** 
(0.042) 
  1.209*** 
(0.043) 
 1.205*** 
(0.061) 
Trade Cohesion   1.057 
(0.057) 
  1.061 
(0.052) 
1.052 
(0.043) 
GDP Growth 
(Annual %) 
   0.938*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.941*** 
(0.014) 
0.941*** 
(0.014) 
0.942*** 
(0.014) 
Interstate Major 
Episodes of Violence 
(inttot) 
   1.616** 
0.287 
1.661** 
(0.297) 
1.489* 
(0.268) 
1.582* 
(0.288) 
Crisis Tally    1.019 
(0.056) 
1.030 
(0.057) 
1.054 
(0.057) 
1.033 
(0.057) 
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Population Growth 
(Annual %) 
   2.090 
(0.824) 
2.021 
(0.792) 
2.223* 
(0.874) 
1.982 
(0.783) 
[Population Growth 
(Annual %)]2 
   0.689** 
(0.062) 
0.749** 
(0.070) 
0.711*** 
(0.068) 
0.739** 
(0.070) 
Calendar year 1.009 
(0.005) 
1.000 
(0.005) 
1.014 
(0.005) 
0.993 
(0.007) 
0.987 
(0.007) 
0.995 
(0.007) 
0.986 
(0.007) 
Log likelihood -797.439 -788.518 -804.122 -769.653 -762.697 -774.282 -760.336 
n 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
Number of Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
NOTE – Coefficients are reported as odds ratios; standard errors are reported in parentheses; 
all independent variables are measured with a one-year lag; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
The first three models in Table XI are models built with only the 
explanatory variable and a time trend. These models are followed by three 
models that include a single explanatory variable with all the control variables. 
The final model includes all variables. In Mode 8, Structural Equivalence in 
Trade is highly statistically significant at p<0.001 level with a magnitude of 8.2% 
increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation for every unit increase in the 
measure. In Model 9, Role Equivalence in Trade is statistically significant at the 
same level with a high magnitude of 22.8% in the odds of a revolutionary 
situation for every unit increase in the measure. Model 10 reveals no statistical 
significance for Trade Cohesion although its magnitude is in the expected 
direction with a 5.7% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation for every 
unit increase in the measure.  
Models 11, 12, and 13 introduce the control variables to the models. 
Despite the introduction of the controls, the results do not deviate much from the 
first three models. In Model 11, Structural Equivalence in Trade remains 
statistically significant at p<0.001 level. Its magnitude diminishes slightly to an 
increase of 7.6% in the odds of revolutionary situations for every unit increase in 
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the measure. In Model 12, a similar observation can be made for Role 
Equivalence in Trade with its statistical significance at p<0.001 level and a slight 
drop of its magnitude to 20.9% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation 
for every unit increase in the measure. In Model 13, Trade Cohesion fails to reach 
statistical significance again. In all these models, Annual GDP Growth, Interstate 
Major Episodes of Violence, and Population Growth are statistically significant 
and have magnitudes in the expected directions. Higher levels of annual GDP 
growth have a negative impact in the odds of a revolutionary situation happening 
in a given year. The effect is a 6.2% decrease in the odds of a revolutionary 
situation for every percent increase of Annual GDP growth in a year for Model 11 
and 5.9% decrease for Models 12 and 13. A unit increase in Interstate Major 
Episodes of Violence increases the odds of a revolutionary situation by 61.6%, 
66.1%, and 48.9% in the Models 11, 12, and 13 respectively. Population Growth 
displays a u-shaped effect where lower values of population growth significantly 
decrease the odds of a revolutionary situation, but higher values of population 
growth significantly increases them. Crisis Tally is not statistically significant in 
these models. 
Finally, Model 14 controls for all the variables. Here, Structural 
Equivalence in Trade loses its statistical significance and the magnitude drops to 
a value that makes less than a 0.001% increase. Its confidence interval is between 
a 5.2% decrease and a 5.6% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation, 
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stressing its failure to reach significance. Whereas, the Structural Equivalence in 
Trade loses its magnitude in significance, Role Equivalence in Revolution reveals 
a very similar result to Model 12 with reaching statistical significance again at the 
level of p<0.001 and a magnitude of 20.5% increase in the odds of a 
revolutionary situation for every unit increase in the measure. This variable has 
the second highest level of significance in the model after Annual GDP Growth. 
Its magnitude corresponds to an increase of 45.5% increase in the odds of a 
revolutionary situation for every standard deviation increase in Role Equivalence 
in Trade. Control variables display similar results in the final model with all of 
them reaching statistical significance remaining statistically significant in the 
same direction of magnitude. Crisis Tally fails to reach statistical significance in 
this model as well. 
10. Discussion and Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to investigate effects of international strains on 
revolutionary situations. As recent reviews in the literature pointed out 
international strains are not included in all the analysis of variations and when 
they do they might not always be considered to have causal effects. This results in 
a gap in the literature regarding the topography of international strains (Go 2014, 
Lawson 2015). To diminish this gap, I have created measures of connectedness 
across different dimensions of relationships related to trade in the global space. 
Compared to previous research, which identify the revolutionary waves based on 
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cultural connections, I have refrained from a priori identification of waves, but 
instead applied tests o investigate linkages through these three dimensions of 
trade. The three hypotheses were derived from existing research in the literature 
of revolutions. 
The results confirm the significance of international strains on revolutions. 
Future research should continue to account for international strains and treat 
them rigorously. Moreover, the models further point towards confirming a 
common finding in the literature on the importance of global positioning. The 
two hypotheses that revealed significant results in models were derived from 
previous findings that suggested that the positioning in the world system play a 
significant role. Out of the two measures testing the effects of global positions, 
Role Equivalence in Trade has reached statistical significance at p<0.001 in all 
levels and revealed a high magnitude all models. This hints that clusters of 
revolutionary situations across time are highly clustered around countries that 
share a similar role in global trade networks5. This is likely to be due to foreign 
groups having a similar perception regarding role equivalent countries. However, 
Structural Equivalence in Trade losing its significance when Role Equivalence is 
introduced might be hinting another process, as it will be discussed below along 
with hypothesis 3. 
Although there was no confirmation for hypothesis 3, this does not 
necessarily negate the previous findings regarding world cultural linkages. While 
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these results reveal that there does not seem to be any process of cohesion or 
normative mimesis happening among trade partners, other cultural linkages such 
as religious networks or immigration networks might play a significant role in the 
diffusion of revolutionary situations and future research should investigate them. 
Other types of cultural networks should rigorously be studied in the future 
research, especially the complication of results in Model 14, which hints that the 
Structural Equivalence in Trade might be spurious. If indeed the real effect is 
happening due to Role Equivalence and not Structural Equivalence, this might 
also indicate a mimetic behavior. 
Previously in the organizations literature, Role Equivalence in Trade has 
been interpreted as a proxy for competitive mimicry and explained as a world 
cultural process in economic sociology literature. While this explanation is fitting 
for diffusion of practices and institutions, it does not fit as well for the case of 
revolutions as competition among revolutionaries is unlikely. However, there 
could be two alternative explanations based on this line of thought opposed to the 
hypothesis derived above based on dependency arguments. One potential 
explanation could be competition among states in the global markets resulting in 
a zero-sum game for states specializing in certain type of products in certain time 
periods. Therefore, by mimicking the behavior of their competitors, countries 
might be experiencing higher strains eventually leading to revolutionary 
situations in competitors. A second potential explanation could be due to the 
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people of countries trading in similar products sharing a similar culture. The 
people of a country specializing in agriculture might identify more with another 
country’s fellow farmers. This might result in Selbin (2010)’s concept of mimesis 
due to familiarity. Future research should focus on uncovering these effects. 
As these results show, further scrutiny of global processes can significantly 
increase our understandings of not only global processes, but also state 
institutions. Previously, these measures of interconnectedness were used in 
economic sociology and management literatures to test economic and business 
related phenomena. This paper finds that these dimensions of trade networks 
have significant effects beyond economic phenomena. Global networks also affect 
political and social crises. These findings add more to the existing evidence of 
embeddedness of markets in social processes.  
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1 There were two main reasons for opting for a binary categorical variable as the dependent 
variable. First, although they are not as rare as successful revolutionary outcomes, revolutionary 
situations are still rare events. Most countries in the sample do not experience more than a single 
revolutionary situation in a given year so a binary categorical variable is less susceptible to being 
affected by outlier cases. Second, negative binomial models are not as easily controlled for 
conditional fixed effects properly (Allison and Waterman 2002). Using a binary categorical 
variable allows for building logistic regression models with conditional fixed effects. Negative 
binomial models using domestic7 variable with random effects provided similar results to the 
models with random effects presented in the paper. 
2 Version 3.0 of the Bilateral Trade Dataset reported in dyadic trade relationships was used to 
build the measures. Accessed on Jan 15, 2015. The data can be found online at 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
3 World Development Indicators Dataset can be found online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators I have relied on the STATA version compiled by Joseph N. 
Cohen available at www.josephncohen.info Accessed on May 16, 2013 
4 Goldstone argues for an interaction between domestic variables, however, the models that tested 
for interactions between crisis_tally and inttot did not reveal any significant results. Because 
revolutionary events are relatively rare, introducing too many problems might create problems 
due to losing degrees of freedom. Due to the this reason and lack of statistical significance in 
interaction terms, the interactions were dropped in the models reported. 
5 Models controlling for Terms of Trade adjustment (constant LCU) (NYTTFGNFSKN) variable 
from WDI neither changed the significance levels of any of the other variables nor revealed any 
statistically significant effects of Terms of Trade. The coefficient displayed a 0% magnitude of 
effect in the odds of revolutionary situations. This suggests role equivalence effect is happening 
independent of global price changes. Models with this variable were not reported in the paper due 
to introducing missing data problems (Number of observations in fixed effects models drops to 
1805). 
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ARTICLE 3: A THEORY OF STATE SECULARIZATION THROUGH 
POST-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL CONTENTION 
1. Abstract 
State Secularization is a process involving mobilization, political tactics, and 
resources as opposing forces struggle over three major institutional dimensions. 
Examining the history of state secularization in Turkey, Mexico, and France in 
the aftermath of revolutions, this paper demonstrates that the degree of 
secularization is determined by political contention. (1) The revolutionary state 
attempts to seize church property, which opens the way for further struggles. (2) 
If the church administers law through its own courts, or has an autonomous code 
of law, revolutionary states struggle to substitute secular courts and state-enacted 
law. (3) Churches often control education; a revolutionary state eventually 
attempts to take control of education when it mobilizes sufficient resources for 
the required state capacity. Taking all these dimensions together, the struggle 
over secularization has many partial outcomes and stopping places, and thus 
mixed patterns are much more typical than an ideal type transition to pure 
secularist modernity.  
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2. Introduction 
In September 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the Prime Minister of 
Turkey at the time, made his first visit to Egypt following the fall of Mobarak 
regime and was greeted by signs that stated he was a “hero” and even “the Savior 
of Islam and Saint of Allah.” Speaking to these fervent supporters, which were 
composed mostly of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Erdoğan declared “I 
recommend a secular constitution to Egypt” (İdiz 2011; Vatan 2011). At first, this 
might seem as a triumphant moment from a modernist perspective that expects 
secularism as a historical terminus. Yet, during the same trip Erdoğan also stated 
that secularism is not atheism and individuals cannot be secular. He stressed that 
as an individual, he is a devout Muslim leading a secular state. For such a 
perspective, an individual claiming to be both at the same time is contradictory.  
In this paper, I argue that although they interact and affect each other, 
secularism at state and individual level are different processes. I depart from 
previous works that stress the importance of comparative studies that focus on a 
higher level of analyses (Jacobsohn, 2003; Kuru 2009; Halikiopoulou 2011; 
Dobbelaere 2002; Cady and Hurd 2010). Viewed in a historical and comparative 
perspective, state secularization is the primary driving force of religion’s place in 
social life; as it happens above all in revolutionary transformations. State 
secularization is a struggle over the structural position on religious institutions. 
This struggle is multi-sided and has a range of outcomes because it takes place 
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along three different dimensions of political contention. Instead of assuming that 
secularization is a terminal outcome, I problematize secularization itself, and 
argue that it’s a reversible and continuous process. Instead of binary typologies of 
secular and religious states, but I argue for differentiation on the degree of 
secularism in the state institution at a given time. 
Examining the history of the state secularization in Turkey, France, and 
Mexico, I introduce three structural dimensions and demonstrate how the degree 
of secularization in each is determined by political contention. The pattern of 
these struggles can be generalized as the following: (1) The revolutionary state 
attempts to seize church property. It's motivations may be to overcome 
feudalism, solve government budget problems, or prevent counter-revolutionary 
groups still loyal to the previous regime; in any case, attempting to seize church 
property as a resource for mobilization is the first step. It creates an antagonism 
between the new regime and the Church, and opens the way for further struggles. 
(2) If the Church administers law through its own courts, or has an autonomous 
code of law that the state must respect, revolutionary secularists struggle to 
substitute secular courts and state-enacted law. This happens as secularists 
attempt to legitimate their acts of resource mobilization. But revolutionary states 
may also find it expedient to keep religious institutions as part of the state instead 
of removing or delegitimizing them completely, because they can be used to 
publicize revolutionary changes themselves. Rights of individuals and religious 
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groups to practice religion in their own lives are formed in the context of these 
political struggles over legal institutions. (3) Churches often control education, 
especially elementary education; a revolutionary state eventually attempts to take 
control of education as well, but this process is the most expensive and requires 
the most state capacity; hence it comes later, and may involve substantial 
compromises. Taking all these dimensions together, the struggle over 
secularization has many partial outcomes and stopping places, and thus mixed 
patterns are much more typical than an ideal type transition to pure secularist 
modernity. Indeed, pure secularism in the form of the limitation of religion 
entirely to private life cannot be taken as the default setting, but needs to be 
explained by its own particular political circumstances. 
3. The Ambiguity of Religious Secularization 
Internationally comparative and historical analyses can be useful in filling 
the gaps in literature regarding state secularization that has been criticized for 
the dearth of comparative studies and paying uneven representation of the 
United States of America, as about two thirds of all the articles published in the 
top three sociology journals in the last three decades until 2007 has focused on 
the USA. (Gorski and Altınordu 2008; Smilde and May 2010). United States has 
a unique historical experience of formation of its state institutions and theories 
from this unique trajectory might not always be applicable to other cases and 
might  even lead to operationalization problems in international surveys, when 
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individuals might not be able to relate to the contexts being tested (Bender, 
Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2013).  
For studying state level secularization, comparative analysis has even more 
insight, as focusing on one historical trajectory and potential counterfactuals has 
less power of analysis compared to the information gathered from the variance 
across multiple cases. Specifically, United States as a secular state that allows for 
religious competition is far from being a universal model. As Centeno (2003: 18) 
demonstrates focusing on western examples as the only theoretical models leads 
to ignoring “contingency, contextuality, and relationality [which] play too 
important a role in historical developments to allow for all encompassing general 
laws, and certainly when these are based on faulty samples.” As it will be 
discussed below, church property plays a significant role in the secularization of 
states. Yet, the United States being founded with extremely limited church 
property makes it a deviant case rather than the norm. 
Comparative and historical analysis is also powerful for operationalizing 
Chaves (1994: 750)’s definition of secularism “as the declining scope of religious 
authority,” which directly refers to a dynamic process—“declining,” not declined. 
In order to analyze how the declining scope of a particular institution, 
comparison should be made not only with the trajectory of the institution across 
time, but also its relation to others. These problems have been recognized in the 
existing literature by either providing comparative cases within the religious 
83 
 
space in United States or analyzing various forms of secularisms across the globe 
(Smith 2003a; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008; Cady and Hurd 2010; Levey and 
Modood 2009; Halikiopoulou, 2011; Kuru 2009). In this paper, I add to the 
existing comparative research by focusing on the state formation periods and 
identifying underlying mechanisms that lead to multiple forms of secularism. I 
identify three historical cases of modern state formations in Turkey, Mexico, and 
France, where the rate of secularism at state level significantly increases in the 
aftermath of revolutions. While secularization has been suggested to be a process 
of revolution as a matter of conflict between authorities before (Smith 2003b), 
based on comparing the similarities in the processes experienced in the three 
cases, I find that revolutions may lead to secularization processes by presenting 
the political opportunities that allow opposing groups to significantly alter the 
legitimating processes for the existence of a state. The challenger groups claiming 
power to form the new state can legitimate the formation of the new state by 
deferring to new forms and ideals that would have been entirely available in the 
previous regimes. Specifically reforms of secularization or challenging religious 
authority, cannot even be proposed in forms of state that are legitimated through 
religious authority. Coupled with the necessity to mobilize resources, this leads to 
distancing of the new state’s institutions from the old ones. When previous 
regimes are tightly coupled with religious authorities, following revolutions 
formations of new states happen through rapid secularization at state level. 
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Despite their varying historical trajectories, geopolitical placement, and 
dominant religious authority type, the historical experiences of France, Turkey, 
and Mexico reveal common patterns during their secularization processes. Based 
on these three cases, I argue that secularism of state structure is multi-
dimensional and each dimension of secularism exists in degrees. I focus on the 
mechanisms and patterns that lead to the rise of secular states to provide a macro 
level theory that both sheds light on state structure, religious authority, and how 
those relate to individual religiosity.  
Analyzing how the scope of religious authority is defined through political 
struggles across these identified dimensions allows for an in-depth analysis of 
how secularization is stabilized at state level. I argue that contention over 
distribution of resources acts as a fuse in the process of secularization over state 
level. By establishing a monopoly over the definitions of sacred and mundane in 
societies and power of rituals, religious authority maintains high ideological 
power. In states with strong religious authority, this ideological power is used to 
increase the material power of religious authority as well. This can happen 
through donations from the devout, exemptions from state taxes, or even acting 
as a trustworthy lending institution due to leveraging the status of being the 
representative of a supreme being. Challengers to incumbent authority in the 
state require mobilization of resources. When religious authority owns a 
significant proportion of the resources in such cases, their ownership becomes an 
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issue of contention. Because religious authority’s material power is heavily 
supported by its ideological power, contention over religious property begins a 
process over contention over religious authority’s scope over law, civic rights, 
rituals, and eventually education. In order to maintain the ownership of their 
resources and newly acquired power, challengers begin a process of acquiring 
power in other dimensions to secure their position. 
While these three dimensions are subjects of ongoing political contention, 
they are fairly stable in established states. Property rights, makers and executors 
of law, and the right to provide education are unlikely to go through major 
changes. When they do, they are coupled with fundamental changes in the state 
structure. I argue that secularization of the state is an ongoing political struggle 
that can increase or decrease constantly. In other words, mechanisms of 
secularization and de-secularization are always at work in conflict. However, the 
rate of change under stable states is very slow and hard to analyze. For purposes 
of easier analyses and demonstration of how the contention is fought, state-
formation period provides fruitful examples. This is especially the case for the 
states that are formed in the aftermath of a revolution, where religious authority 
has a high scope over state affairs before the state breakdown. When highly 
religious states face revolutions, the challengers attempting to establish a new 
state require resources for their mobilization. In these cases religious property 
and property protected under the religious authority is perceived as both threat 
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and an opportunity for the challenger groups. Left in the hands of the religious 
authority, these resources might be mobilized for counter-revolutionary 
purposes. Revolutions provide political opportunities for confiscating the church 
property. Confiscation of these resources not only weakens potential threats from 
the previous regime, but also can be utilized for the resource mobilization needs 
for the formation of a new state. In these cases secularization processes begin as a 
by-product of resource mobilization for the new state. Thus, secularization 
processes should not be explained solely as secularist ideologies resulting from 
growing questioning of religious believes, but also be understood as a structural 
mechanism arising due to the needs of a newly forming state, and  they have the 
potential to create ideal situations for state secularization.  
4. “Unsettled lives” and Political Opportunities following Revolutions 
The aftermath of revolutions provide rich evidence for significant swings 
in the degree of secularism in the state structure. Cultural theories accept 
institutions to be fairly stable due to removing uncertainty from situations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The state with its constitution and laws is one of the 
most stable type of institutions. The scope of religious authority in the state 
structure is one of the core institutions in the state as it influences the state’s 
ethos directly. Moreover, as Mische (2009) shows religious networks overlap 
with activist and partisan networks and affect how political contention is shaped. 
Because of the inertia of coded laws and constitution supported by pervasive 
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networks at the micro and meso levels, change in the degree of secularization is 
highly costly and takes place over a long period of time. 
In order to make clear demonstrations, one needs to find cases where 
there are significant changes in the degree of secularization in a state structure. 
Such changes are unlikely to happen in stable states, as secularization requires 
both structural and cultural changes within a state. As McAdam (1999) 
demonstrates such political opportunities play a significant role in the beginning 
of political processes. In the aftermath of revolutions challenger groups are not 
only presented with such structural political opportunities to cease power; but 
they can also find opportunities for striving for changes in the existing forms of 
institutions and scripts. Swidler (1986: 273)’s concepts of culture as a “toolkit” 
and dividing cultural periods into “settled” and “unsettled” provides a powerful 
explanation for why this should be expected. Swidler assumes that culture 
provides a “toolkit” of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 
“strategies of action.” She argues there are two distinct situations of “settled lives” 
and “unsettled lives,” where culture is enacted differently. In “settled lives” 
culture permeates into action and distinct analyses of the two are harder. 
“Unsettled lives,” however, are “periods of social transformation” when  
[e]stablished cultural ends are jettisoned with 
apparent ease, and yet explicitly articulated cultural 
models, such as ideologies, play a powerful role in 
organizing social life… In such periods, ideologies-
explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning 
systems (both political and religious)-establish new 
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styles of strategies of action. When people are 
learning new ways of organizing individual and 
collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until 
they become familiar, then doctrine, symbol and 
ritual directly shape action (278). 
As state-centered theorists have long argued state-breakdown leads to 
revolutions and not vice versa (Collins 1999; Goldstone 1993; Skocpol 1979). 
While these theories argue that ideology is not a decisive cause of revolutions, 
they accept that in its aftermath, ideology becomes significant for how society will 
be reconstructed. As such, these periods create “unsettled lives,” when due to 
increased uncertainty about established legitimacy; individuals rely on explicit 
stated scripts such as ideologies to guide their actions. Because there is no 
commonly agreed upon “settled” culture at these periods, they serve as ideal 
periods for political opportunities to use challenging ideologies to frame in 
opposition to previously dominant ones.  
With regards to secularization processes, they require changes not only in 
the institutional and legal norms but also in the process of legitimizing the 
carried out actions. Thus, secularization at state level requires both structural and 
cultural reforms. The breakdowns of states with high scope of religious authority 
result in such “unsettled” periods and provide “political opportunities” for 
secularism to be a legitimating ideology in political contention for challenger 
groups. While under “settled” periods, it might be highly costly to challenge 
established authority due to being both legally and culturally disallowed, such as 
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being blasphemous and illegal, during “unsettled lives” they might become less 
costly. As the scope of religious authority in a state is tightly coupled with the 
very institutions that form the structure of a state, historical cases of state-
breakdowns serve as great examples for studying such “unsettled” periods. Thus, 
it is expected to find significant changes to the degree of secularism in state 
structure following revolutions, especially in cases when the previous state is 
tightly coupled with a religious or secularist authority. It is, then, not surprising 
to find that certain revolutions might instigate political contention by secularists 
against religious authority. Such cases are seen following the breakdowns of 
states in Turkish, Mexican, and French Revolutions (Table XII). 
Table XIII - Three Cases of State Secularization 
Country Dominant Religion Church Property Law and Civic Rights Education 
Turkey Islam Nationalization of all 
religious property 
with the abolition of 
Caliphate (March 
1924) 
Implementation of 
secular laws (1926), 
Religion removed from 
constitution(1928), 
ongoing regulation of 
people’s religious 
activities in daily lives 
through reforms 
(beginning 1925), 
secularism coded into 
constitution (1937) 
Education brought 
under education 
ministry (1924). Major 
education campaigns in 
1930s. 
France Catholic Church Confiscation of all 
church property after 
the Great Revolution 
(1789) 
Secularizing reforms and 
regulation of religious 
activities following the 
revolution (1789-1801). 
Secularization reforms 
begin again in the Third 
republic after 1880. 
Secularism coded into 
constitution in 1905. 
Institutional legal 
changes following the 
Great Revolution (1794-
1795). Ferry Laws 
secularizing education 
with educational 
campaigns (1879-
1886). 
 
Mexico Catholic Church First major 
confiscation attempts 
with limited success 
in mid 19th century 
(1859 – act on 
nationalization of 
church property). 
Property ownership of 
church banned by 
1917 constitution. 
Secularization reforms in 
mid 19th century. Anti-
clerical and anti religious 
constitution of 1917 goes 
in effect following 
revolution in 1910. 
Secularization and close 
scrutiny over religious 
authority 1917-1929. 
Deportation of 
educators from 
religious clergy to 
provide education only 
from secular educators 
(1924). 
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5. Secularizing Revolutions in Turkey, Mexico, and France 
 All three cases witness such revolutions when pre-revolutionary regime is 
closely identified with the religious authority. Of the three cases the Turkish case 
reveals the most rapid undertaking of the reforms across the three dimensions 
with a concerted effort in the first 20 years following the declaration of the 
Republic. This happens partly because it happens later than the other cases and 
the rule makers of the new state have learned from the previous experiences of 
secularization. Here, the Turkish case is presented first, as it involves a more 
continuous increase in the rate of the secularization of its state in the period 
analyzed1. 
 At the end of world war during the revolutionary period when a dual 
sovereignty situation arises in the Ottoman Empire, both groups making a claim 
for the sovereign state identify state and religious authority in unison. Specifically 
the revolutionary parliament in Ankara is opened with the goal of saving the 
Sultan and the Caliphate (Akgun 1985). The Emperor of Ottoman Empire also 
held the title of Caliphate of Islam leaning on legitimating the state authority 
through religious justification (Deringil 1991) Similarly, in France before the 
Great Revolution in 1789, monarchy was closely connected to the Catholic 
Church. Since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, Roman Catholic 
Church had monopoly over religious domain in France. The Church had 
established economic independence and had exercised sovereignty upon its own 
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institution. Furthermore, the Church had authority over non-religious domains 
as it exercised nearly complete authority over education, provided public 
assistance and healthcare, held registers over births, deaths, and marriages, 
provided employment, and had the power of censorship. In the last 15 years 
before the revolution, about 90% of the bishops belonged to the nobility (Lewy 
1974). Following the First Federal Republic of Mexico in 1824, Catholic religion 
was seen as one of the three pillars of Mexico, where the Church enjoyed greater 
wealth than the state and held special privileges (fueros) (Bazant 1991).  
In each three cases, the fall of empires through revolutions begins a 
process of secularization of state, which results in the scope of religious authority 
significantly diminishing in the institutions of the new states. Turkey and France 
had secularism coded into their constitution (Kuru 2009). Mexican has 
significantly limited the rights of church and civic rights of clergy and until the 
recent constitutional reforms in 1992 it could be described as “a secular 
anticlerical state, with anti-religious traits” (Reyes, 2010: 511). The length of the 
process varied across the three cases. In France and Mexico, it was spread over a 
century but in Turkey it took about two decades. Yet in all three cases, these 
contentions take place across three dimensions: (1) religious property, (2) law 
and civic rights, (3) education. 
These dimensions of contention are experienced in the stated order 
although they can overlap. The issue of property is fought over first and the 
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outcome of how the material resources are distributed among religious and 
secularist groups become path-dependent in the secularization process of the 
state structure. As social movements literature informs, resource mobilization 
plays an important role in successful social movements. Opposed to the previous 
regime, in the post-revolutionary period the newly forming nation-state require 
material resources to compete for power. Since the ancién-regime gains its 
legitimacy through religious authority, revolutions allow the challenger groups to 
confiscate the wealth of not only the previous regime but also the closely tied 
religious authority. This might happen not only by revoking the monetary 
privileges of the religious authority, but also through confiscating religious 
property. The process begins with limiting the scope of religious authority on 
property because the act is used for mobilizing the resources for future political 
contentions. This act not only creates resource mobilization, but it also literally 
takes away the resources of religious authority and their supporters for the future 
contentions. The contention across the other dimensions can only succeed for the 
secularist groups after significantly limiting the scope of religious authority on 
property rights. Successful resource mobilization through antagonizing the 
religious authority leads to political contention across law and civic rights. 
Contention across this dimension happens to legitimate the new resources of 
state and gather support from the masses. 
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The law dimension is the contention for legitimacy of secularist ideologies 
at the macro level. Issues of whether to define a state religion or not, writing the 
constitution, criminal and civil codes, and whether they should be beholden to 
religious authority are decided through political struggles between the two 
groups. Secularist groups attempt to limit the scope of religious authority in law 
by forming secular judiciary and removing clergy from administration of law. 
They also attempt to secularize daily life by removing religion from public 
activities. The dimension of civic rights is the process of legitimation in the micro 
level. During the contentious period, both secularist and religious groups 
compete for dominance in society. They attempt to regulate public life through 
regulations and rituals. In the extreme periods of contention they might revoke 
certain civic rights entirely through declaring martial law.  
The dimension of education begins in later stages as it is intended to 
trickle down the process to future generations and stabilize it. Secularizing 
education begins after there has been significant process in secularizing law and 
civic rights. This is because when the right of secular education is illegal, political 
opportunities for contention do not exist. The rate of secularism in the structure 
of state is determined by how contentions across these three dimensions are 
resolved.  
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6. Political Struggle over Church Property 
Political contention over church property plays a key role in secularization 
processes. In states, where religious authority has a high scope, they maintain 
high ideological power (Mann 1986), but their scope is not limited to the 
ideological sphere. In absolute monarchies and pre-modern states, they also 
possess great material power by owning resources and holding privileges. The 
Ottoman Empire was based on the principle of forming religious war against the 
infidels and has been structured by its gaza principle throughout its existence 
(Inalcik [1994] 1997). In 1789 France, the Church had 10-15% of all the property 
in its possession, yet only paid 2% of taxes collected by the state due to waivers 
(Sargent and Velde 1995). In Mexico, after the independence, Catholic Church 
was the richest institution (Matson 1979). Economic resources play a large role in 
maintaining religious authorities’ wide scope. Material power plays a key role in 
defeating rivals in social conflict and opposing parties strive to attain greater 
material power all the time (Collins 2012). Thus, secularization processes are 
unlikely to succeed against a religious authority that attains both great material 
and ideological power.  
When these states broke down, the challengers forming the new state 
began to expropriate the material resources of the previous regime. Because the 
material resources of the previous regime were equated with religious authority, 
this led to enacting secularist ideologies. In order to distance oneself from the 
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ancién-regime, religious ideologies were also alienated. Thus, the blasphemous 
idea of stealing God’s property, was legitimated through the nation claiming its 
rights. As this happened, the newly forming states not only increased their 
material resources, but also diminished the material resources of their main 
oppositions. In all three cases, the secularization processes began with 
appropriation of the material power belonging to the religious authority. Due to 
the radical nature of the act, it took place during a revolutionary period or war 
time, when there was imminent physical conflict.  
In Turkey, the parliament of the newly formed republic could confiscate 
church property rapidly. This was mostly due to the economic and political 
weaknesses of the Ottoman State in the 19th and early 20th century. Following the 
sovereign default in 1875, the Ottoman State had given up part of its sovereignty 
to collect revenues to the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, which was 
overseen by European representatives (Eldem 2005). The heavy defeat in World 
War I and invasion of allied forces on the Ottoman Land led to a revolutionary 
period with double sovereignty. While the Sultanate continued its claim in 
Istanbul, a rival parliament convened in Ankara to save the Sultanate and the 
Caliphate (Akgün 1985).  For the revolutionary government in Ankara, the 
weakness of the Ottoman State’s sovereignty represented a political opportunity. 
The parliament in Ankara assumed the taxation rights of the Istanbul rule and 
blocked Istanbul’s trade resources. They also exercised sovereignty over any land 
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that they won back from the allied invaders (Müderrisoğlu [1997] 2007). 
Following the end of independence war and declaration of peace with the Entente 
Powers, the parliament separated the institution of Caliphate from the Sultanate. 
As the last Ottoman Emperor Mehmed VI fled the country, a new Caliph was 
elected by the parliament. By separating the two entities, the parliament 
attempted to revoke the religious authority’s sovereignty over the public treasury. 
Yet, the demands of Caliphate, which included having a share of the public 
budget that asked ten times the amount allotted for the presidential office, led to 
the parliament’s abolishing of the position. With the abolishing of the Caliphate 
all the religious treasuries and waqfs—properties guaranteed under protection of 
religious authority—were also nationalized. Once the law regarding the Caliphate 
was passed, confiscation was perceived as a natural act (Akgün 1985). 
In France, the financial crisis, which played a significant role in leading to 
the breakdown of Ancien Régime, also created the political opportunity to light 
the fuse for the secularization process. The process was similar, as the 
nationalization of the church property was one of the first acts of the 
revolutionaries. The August 4th Decrees issued in 1789 abolished all tithes 
including those collected by the Church (Dwyer and McPhee 2002). The first 
anticlerical act of the revolutionary government began with nationalizing 
religious property, as they issued the decree on the confiscation of Church 
property on November 2, 1789 about 3 months after the declaration of the Rights 
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of Man. The decree nationalized all Church property and promised minimum 
salaries for the clergy. This decree was the first of a series of decrees that would 
be issued in the next six years regarding the issues of secularization of state. 
Other decrees that would follow would focus on the rights of citizens to freely 
choose their religion, and describing the duties and allegiances of the existing 
clergy. The revolutionaries would also bring reforms to mundane activities in the 
daily life to decouple them from religious connotations such as the 
implementation of a new calendar, but it is worth noting that the secularization 
process began first with the issue of religious property. Moreover, most of these 
rapid secularization attempts were reversed at the end of the highly contentious 
revolutionary period when Napoleon assumed power, but the religious property 
that was confiscated during the Revolutionary period was not returned. When 
Napoleon signed the Concordat with the Holy See, Vatican accepted the 
legitimacy of the confiscations and ownership of the purchasers in Article 13, 
which states “His Holiness, in the interest of peace and happy reestablishment of 
the Catholic religion, declares that neither he nor his successors will trouble in 
any manner the purchasers of alienated ecclesiastical property, and that, in 
consequence, the ownership of these same properties, and the rights and 
revenues attached to them, shall rest unchallenged in their hands or in those of 
their assigns” (Maclear 1995: 97). The confiscation of the Church property and 
removal of tithes collected by the Church was part of the economic reforms 
carried out by the revolutionaries to overcome the economic crisis, but this has 
98 
 
also resulted in the secular state securing its position against the religious 
authority by significantly crippling its resources for mobilization.  
In Mexico, following the declaration of independence in 1821, the Church 
was “the richest single corporation in the country” (Costeloe 1967: 2). The 
independence was followed by turmoil and ongoing conflict both within the 
Mexican State and with international powers. While both liberal and conservative 
governments made multiple attempts to confiscate church property to finance the 
weak state budget, they were unsuccessful until the reform period beginning with 
Lerdo Law in 1856. In this initial period following the independence, the Church 
not only owned great amounts of real estate, but also had successfully turned its 
ideological power into a material one through acting as the only lending bank in 
Mexico. The perennial existence of Church had been transformed into trust for 
investors. In the early years, high government debt and lack of funds in the state 
did not provide sufficient legitimacy for those in power to simply confiscate 
church property to raise revenues. Existing resource mobilization of the Church 
thwarted such attempts. The confiscation of the Church property only became 
possible when there is an “unsettled period” due to a rebellion, for which the 
Church could be blamed. This was the beginning of the reform period with the 
Lerdo Law of 1856. While the reform in the next three decades removed the 
position of the Church as the dominant bank and confiscated about two thirds of 
its property, the Church maintained its wealth through 1870s recovering through 
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donations of the wealthy supporters (Bazant 2008; Costeloe 1967). In the 
Mexican case, the failure of rapid and complete confiscation of religious property 
by the anticlerical groups had spillover effects on how the political contention 
fared in the other dimensions. The Church, which managed to find new channels 
of income after losing its role as the national bank and losing its property, 
remained as a formidable opponent against the anticlerical groups. Following the 
Mexican Revolution, the Church was still perceived as a threat by the anticlerical 
groups, which resulted in the Church losing its legal status in Mexico and being 
banned from property ownership after the 1917 constitution (Reyes 2010). Unlike 
the Turkish and French cases; however, the religious authority’s resources 
allowed for armed resistance against the secular reforms; which resulted in a 3 
year long civil war in the country between 1926 and 1929. 
7. Political Struggle over Religious Law and Civic Rights 
The second dimension of political struggle over secularization happens 
over law and civic rights. This dimension has direct effects on the daily lives of 
individuals, as it is contention over defining how the state should regulate the 
behavior over individuals. It determines the limits of religious authority’s 
regulation over citizens as well as secular authority’s regulation over religious 
authority. With the resources mobilized through limiting religious authority, the 
secularizing groups attempt to legitimate their state structure through shaping 
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the law accordingly. The amount of resources mobilized from curbing religious 
property has an affect on the degree of contention and the results.  
In Turkey, the rapid nationalization of all religious property to the modern 
state allowed for the secularist groups to implement legal changes with relatively 
weak political opposition after the end of the War of Independence and 
declaration of the Republic in 1923. Yet, as mentioned above, the economy of the 
Ottoman Empire before the World War I was weak and despite the 
nationalization of all the property that belonged to the religious authority and the 
Sultanate, the existing resources for the infrastructure of the country was limited. 
This led to the Turkish secularization groups co-opting the religious property and 
religious networks completely, instead of abolishing them. While the parliament 
was initially founded to save the Caliphate and the Sultanate, as stated above 
(Akgün 1985), the constitution of the parliament described the administrative 
order and the mission of the parliament during wartime did not specify any 
religion; however, its seventh article stated that the right of the execution of 
Sharia Law belonged to the parliament. Thus, initially the revolutionary 
parliament was founded on the premise of both saving and administrating the 
religious authority. However, after the War of Independence following the 
invasion of allied forces at the end of World War I was won, in November 1922, 
the Sultanate was deemed illegal. The institution of Caliphate was separated from 
Sultanate was brought under the power of parliament, which would elect the 
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Caliphs. When the republic was declared on October 29th, 1923, the constitution 
was revised to include that the religion of Turkish State was Islam while still 
keeping the article about administrating Sharia Law (Kili, 1980).  
In March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, as it was perceived as a 
significant political rival by the parliament. The same day Sharia Courts were also 
removed (Akgün 1985). The Caliphate was replaced with the Islamic Directorate, 
which served under the office of the prime minister as a tool for legitimating the 
secular state, government, and parliament. It could issue religious fatwas in 
accordance with the ideologies of the parliament, as well as issuing sermon 
scripts for Friday prayers to the imams of the mosques, who were employed and 
inspected by the directorate. These early legal changes transformed the legal 
structure of state from one, where the secular parliament was bound to the 
religious authority, to a new legal framework, where the religious authority was 
bound to secular authority. However, due to internal struggles within the 
parliament, the new constitution that the parliament set into place in 1924 still 
defined Islam as the religion of the state (Kili, 1980). In 1926, new civil and 
criminal codes were introduced, which were both adapted from European 
counterparts. In 1928, a defined religion was removed from the constitution. 
These changes made citizens legally responsible against the authority of secular 
state, instead of the religious authority.  
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While these legal changes defined the state structure, reforms were also 
introduced to secularize the behavior of citizens in their daily lives. In late 1925, 
the hat and clothing revolution was imposed, which required men to wear a 
European hat. It brought strict controls over the representation of self in public 
and attempted to eliminate traditional clothing emblems, which were also 
imbued with religious connotations, and replace them with what were perceived 
as “modern” ones. These reforms also banned religious clergy from wearing their 
religious clothing in public. The Islamic Directorate collaborated with the 
government’s efforts in spreading the reforms. Regulation of the clothing of the 
religious authority diminished their status in public sphere. Many of the religious 
officials also had other economic affairs and their religious clothing would help 
them in their daily affairs. Removal of religious symbols from public space 
disallowed them from using their religious status in non-religious transactions, 
which became problematic for them. At the end of 1925, international time and 
calendar was adopted. In 1934, surname law was imposed, which standardized 
people’s names instead of relying on their statuses in public (Kili, 1980). In 1935, 
weekend was changed into Sundays instead of Fridays as a holiday on which 
communal Friday prayers also took place (Yılmaz 2013). Finally in 1937, the 
secularism of Turkish State was coded into its constitution. 
The legal reforms that were carried out in the two decades that followed 
World War I, represents a unique case of rapid legal secularization. A state with a 
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constitutionally defined religion, whose laws were executed through religious 
authority, and a public life, which revolved around time units, weekdays and 
calendar years set around religious ritual, was transformed into a constitutionally 
secular state with a secular public outlook. Through legal secularization, the new 
secular state was able to not only curb the scope of religious authority but also 
subdue its opponents.  
While the Turkish experience demonstrates as an extremely rapid case, 
where revolutionaries introduce rapid reforms after entirely co-opting both 
material and ideological resources of the established religious authority, 
similarities can be found in the French and Mexican cases. The French case 
reveals that the process of secularization is not linear and can be reversible in 
both directions. While there was a period of rapid secularization following the 
1789 Revolution, religious authority partly recovered its power during the 
periods, when the Republic fell and the Empire was reestablished. France 
eventually became a constitutionally secular state through the lengthy politically 
contentious period across both the legal/civic rights and education dimensions in 
the Third Republic from 1871 onwards.  
Following the 1789  Revolution,  the August 4th Decrees abolished the  
feudal system and every citizen was allowed to hold any ecclesiastic, civilian, or 
military positions. The Declaration of Human Rights issued in the same month 
placed state law above all. About a year later in July 1790, a Decree on the Civil 
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Constitution of Clergy was issued, which described the structure of the Church, 
its election processes, and its relationship with the Pope, disallowing clergy to ask 
the Pope for any confirmation. The decree also included Article 21, which 
stipulated that clergy must declare their allegiance to the nation before the 
consecration ceremony. About three months later in November the decree on 
Clerical Oath was issued, which required all the clergy to swear to be faithful to 
the nation and its law (Maclear 1995).  
While legal changes were made to remove religious authority at the level of 
state structure, in the period of radical struggle in 1793-94, Robespierre also 
attempted to drastically change the daily lives of individuals through attempting 
to impose a new religion of supreme being. This attempt included changing the 
perception of calendar time through imposing 10-day weeks to decouple the 
calendar from religion as well as introducing the new metric measurement 
system. Marriage was changed into civil law and became a contract, rather than 
an oath made under divine law (Sewell 1985). Not all of these reforms lasted long. 
The radical social transformation following the revolution brought about the 
reign of Terror alongside; which was succeeded by Napoleonic rule. Napoleon 
followed less anti-clerical politics and signed Concordat with the Pope. The 
concordat restored the oaths but still allowed the practice of religions other than 
Catholicism within France. Following the Napoleonic Rule, King Louis XVIII 
restored the Church in 1815. 
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In the Third Republic, which was declared in 1871 after a war defeat by 
Prussia, political contentions over secularization fired up again. In March 1880, 
decrees against unauthorized religious congregations were issued. In July 1880, a 
law was passed that removed the obligatory Sunday rest. In July 1884, divorces 
were deemed legal again and public prayers were banned. Government measures 
were taken against religious teaching orders in 1901.  France finally became 
constitutionally secular in 1905, about a century after the series of  revolutions 
began in 1789. While the secularization process parallels the Turkish case by 
carrying out reforms both on the legal framework and daily activities, the French 
case should make us recognize that secularization is not a unidirectional process 
and that reversals of direction are possible everywhere, driven by the dynamics of 
political contention.  
The first constitution of Mexico in 1824 stated that “[t]he religion of the 
Mexican nation is and shall be perpetually the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman 
religion. The nation protects it with wise and just laws and prohibits the exercise 
of any other” (Bazant 1991: 9). During the reform period in mid 19th century, 
beginning with constitution of 1857, a series of reform laws were passed to limit 
the scope of religious authority including the implementation of freedom of 
religion and civil marriages. The reforms and amendments made to the 
constitution in 1873 and 1874 introduced the principle of “separation between the 
Church and the State” to the constitution (Reyes, 2010: 509). Following the 
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revolution in 1910, the new constitution in 1917 had articles for regulating 
religious worship and banning clergy from criticizing the state. In 1926, President 
Calles increased the pressure on clergy by passing a law that made religious 
offenses to be prosecuted as criminal cases. This was responded to, first by the 
clergy going on strike, then by the Cristeros Civil War between 1926-1929. 
As the legal changes experienced in the three cases above reveal, the legal 
dimension of secularization plays a role in both legitimizing secularism and 
affecting people’s daily lives. Religious people are left with no choice but to live 
according to secularist conventions if they choose to continue to participate in 
public space. Otherwise going into public with banned religious garments or 
other emblems can result in them being removed from the public space through 
incarceration or even execution. 
8. Political Struggle over Religious Education 
As the legal and civic rights changes that increase secularization 
disseminate through the public, secularization across education dimension 
begins. Similar to the pattern in the previous dimension discussed above, 
education is initially secularized legally earlier on, but practical implementation 
takes a longer time period. Another common pattern across the education 
dimension is that secularization initially begins at more advanced levels. In 
Turkey, education was united under a single curriculum with the Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Law on the same day that the Caliphate was removed on March 3rd, 
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1924. With this law, the medreses, which served as religious advanced level 
schools were also shut down and transformed into secular universities. While this 
initial reform was carried out early on, the real thrust towards educational reform 
began in 1928 following the removal of religion from the constitution. The state 
focused on increasing literacy rates among the public while also educating them 
on a common national identity. This began in 1928 with the introduction of the 
new Turkish Alphabet based on the Latin Alphabet. This was followed by the 
opening of National Schools (Millet Mektepleri) at the end of the same year 
(Yılmaz 2013). These schools aimed at teaching the new letters to the citizens of 
all ages. Turkish History Institution and Turkish Language Institutions were 
founded in 1931 and 1932 respectively, to further the secular education. The 
foundation of Turkish Language Institute gave the start for “the Language 
Revolution,” which attempted to create a secular nation that all speaks the 
modern Turkish language. While these attempts were not very successful due to 
limited resources and lack of finances, meanwhile the number of primary schools 
and students enrolled were increased (Cumhuriyet Arşivi, n.d.). In the Turkish 
case one main obstacle against increasing the number of students enrolled were 
the lack of educated secular teachers, who could be appointed. This served as one 
reason to why more advanced levels of schooling were secularized first. 
In France, the revolutionaries’ Constitution of 1793 included provisions for 
universal education; however, it did not come to be enacted due to lack of 
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resources. Despite the decree in November 1794 stressing the idea of universal 
education, a year later the decree issued in October 1795, made education 
optional again. Hampson ([1963]1995) states that at this period the main concern 
was on the écoles centrales, which provided secondary education in each 
Department. These schools would not be accessible to those with only primary 
education. These early stages echo the Turkish case and the Tevhid-i Tedrisat 
law. In both cases the legal framework on education changed, but enactment was 
left for later stages due to lack of resources. In the initial stages attention was 
paid to education at more advanced levels in both cases because these advanced 
levels served the more immediate needs of the secularists. In the Turkish case, 
those educated in foreign universities were brought into high positions in the 
state to lead departments. Also focusing on advanced education disproportionally 
benefits the classes that support the secularist cause. In the case of France, the 
écoles centrales mostly benefited the bourgeoisie.  
Unlike the Turkish case, the French case was a lengthy process of state 
secularization that spread across a century. While the confiscation of religious 
property was rapidly achieved in the beginning, the law and civic rights 
dimension spread over century with swings between republics and monarchies. 
The major political contention over universal secular education took place in the 
Third Republic, when the Ferry Laws were introduced by a reforming Minister of 
Education between 1879 and 1886. The law on June 16, 1881 established public 
109 
 
education. The enactment of the law of October 30th, 1886 removed clergy from 
primary schools. This law provided a 5-year transition period for male schools, 
during which those with religious memberships would have to be replaced. 
Female schools did not have any such limits, but required that nuns were to be 
replaced by secular teachers in new teaching positions due to retirements, death 
or reassignments (Lehning 2001). The urgency for secularizing primary schools 
for males was related to the fact that this was a period of heavy debates and 
political struggles over universal manhood suffrage. 
In Mexico, contention over secular education was heavily affected by the 
power of the Church throughout the 19th Century and carried onto the 20th 
Century. Because of the existence of a strong Church backed by material 
resources, the educational secularization went through progress and reversals. 
During the reform period in mid-19th Century, attempts were made at removing 
the Church’s control over education; however, by the end of century during the 
Porfirian period, the Church’s support to President Porfirio Diaz allowed them to 
be dominant in educational institutions again. After the revolution, The Church 
faced a serious backlash, as it suffered from being identified with the Porfirian 
regime. The constitution of 1917 banned religious education completely. Though 
Mexican State and the Church collaborated briefly again in 1920-1924 due to lack 
of state resources to provide secular education, once President Calles assumed 
power in 1924, a highly anticlerical program began, which included enforcing the 
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constitutional ban on religious education as well as deporting foreign clergy, most 
of which were educators. These rulings along with the harsher rulings discussed 
above in the law and civic rights dimension, resulted in the civil war, which ended 
in an accord that would not allow any religious education in state schools, but 
give freedom to the Church to provide religious education in church property 
(Espinoza 2015).    
The dimension of education gets implemented in the later stages of 
secularization, because its purpose is achieving stability and longevity for the 
status quo. It also serves to further legitimate the secularist structure of the state, 
through inculcating future generations with the secularist ideology. 
9. Conclusion: The Sequence of Secularizing Institutional Changes 
Secularization of the state is not a binary concept. While coding 
secularization into the constitution of the state might represent a significant 
capstone, the rates of secularization vary across different dimensions. As these 
cases show, patterns depend on how the contention is fought among different 
parties. Confiscation of church property happens early in the formation of the 
revolutionary state and lights the fuse of the secularization process. The amount 
of existing church property and the rate of confiscation have lasting effects on the 
other dimensions. In the Turkish case the dearth of religious property or other 
wealth from the previous regime results in the secularist state co-opting the 
ideological and network power of the religious authority, rather than entirely 
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weakening it. Compared to the French case, where attempts are made to remove 
or reduce the number of clergy, Turkish State creates an Islamic directorate to 
dictate the type of religious sermon that supports the secular state. While the 
secular state diminishes the scope of religious authority, they do not aim to 
remove it entirely.  
For the periods discussed, all cases carry out reforms that affect both legal 
codes to transform the state structure and public practices to transform 
individual’s daily behavior. Not only is defined religion removed from state 
constitution, other practices are dictated upon citizens to decouple their behavior 
and habits from religious authority. These include, but are not limited to, 
acceptable clothing in public, freedom of speech, and even perception of calendar 
time. Such changes make secularization of state a mandatory act to be accepted 
by citizens, rather than something to be opted in (Yılmaz 2013). For example in 
the Turkish and Mexican cases, if religious authorities want to appear in public 
places, they must remove their religious clothing, otherwise they are severely 
punished. 
In the later stages of state secularization, the permeation of secularist 
values among the public is further achieved through education. Education is not 
only used for crafting literate individuals that can be valued members of the work 
force but also for imbuing the secularist ideas of the state. This is why both who 
gets to teach the students and what is taught to them becomes major issues of 
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contention. Because secularist groups start at a disadvantage compared to clergy 
in terms of not having established schools in these cases, the secularization of 
schools begin at the university level at first. This is both due to a lack of 
secularist, non-clergy teachers to fill in vacant positions in the mass elementary 
schools, and to the budget problem for funding such schools. In later stages, 
attempts are made to secularize primary education.  
These dimensions also play an important role in the reversal of 
secularization processes. Over the last decade, the share of Islamic Directorate 
funds in the Turkish government’s budget has more than doubled. In 2001, the 
year before Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) came into 
power the share of Islamic Directorate in the budget was 0.50%. After gradually 
increasing its share every year, in 2012 it received 1.12% of the government’s 
budget (BUMKO n.d.). The increase in the financial resources of the Islamic 
Directorate was coupled with increases in the scope of its authority, such as a law 
in 2010 allowing Islamic Directorate to ban web sites that provide false 
information on Islam. These developments were followed by educational reforms 
increasing the number of religious teachings in elementary schools.  
The theory presented here is intended to provide the tools for 
understanding the process of secularization beyond these particular cases and 
also for cases, where secularization is reversed. The argument here also stresses 
that the United States can be a misleading case to take as the archetype of the 
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secularization process generally. If the three main processes are a sequence of 
struggles over church property, religious courts and laws, and religious 
education, only the last of these has much importance in the United States. 
Church property, which plays a key role in igniting secularization processes, did 
not have a significant presence in colonial America. Similarly, the American 
states did not have to struggle over a Church monopoly over administration of 
law. Thus the secularizing process in the United States of America began from a 
relatively small scope of religious authority. The main issues of state 
secularization were already disposed of by the time the United States began, and 
it was these rather unusual historical circumstances that led to the vigorous 
religious competition studied extensively by the religious markets literature 
(Finke and Stark 1992). 
As these historical cases reveal, secularization cannot properly be analyzed 
when it is assumed to be a terminal outcome. It is only through problematizing 
secular states, can one understand the mechanisms leading to them. As these 
cases show, neither religious authority nor secular authority is static. Instead, the 
scopes of both authorities vary and can increase or decrease across time. These 
changes happen through political contentions of opposing groups. As one group 
gains more power, they determine the scope of religious authority.  An 
explanatory theory of state secularization must be a theory of the mobilization, 
political tactics and resources of opposing forces, as they struggle over the 
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institutional dimensions that constitute different amounts and kinds of religious 
secularization. This in turn means that increasing religiosity at state level will 
also involve struggle across these dimensions and successful mobilization of 
property or resources available by the Church in secular states are likely to bring 
political contentions across institutional dimensions of law and education in 
secular states.  
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CONCLUSION 
The articles presented in this dissertation reveal that while crises of 
sovereignty occur rarely, they are not random. Even though they might be 
perceived as unexpected and surprising by bystanders, systematic analysis finds 
that crises do not happen in isolation, on the contrary, they are patterned by the 
global developments. 
Study of the trade networks reveals that diffusion of different types of 
crises across the world are significantly affected by the trade relationships that 
countries have with each other. The difficulty for identifying these patterns is due 
to the highly complex and dynamic structure of global trade. Methods 
implementing big data and machine learning used in articles 1 and 2 reveal that 
when used in complementary to the theories derived from the existing 
sociological literature, these methods can be highly beneficial in furthering our 
understanding of sociological phenomena. I find that there is a pattern to global 
diffusion of crises, but more importantly the two articles reveal that this pattern 
is not unique for a certain type of crises, but is seen across various types of 
unrelated crises. This is important for recognizing that countries do not randomly 
get affected by a wave of crises, and one can explain why certain countries stay 
afloat while others sink. 
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The third article studies the aftermath of crises in depth and finds patterns 
to how this global diffusion might be patterned. The findings show that 
secularization of a state is patterned across three major dimensions and the 
struggles between the religious authority and political authority across these 
dimensions determine the type of secularity that is enforced in a state. The 
findings of this paper motivate potential studies that might explain the recent 
developments that are experienced by present-day Turkey, as struggles between 
religious and secular authority still play a certain role in political and social 
crises. 
When looking at a stable regime between secular and religious authorities, 
one should pay specific attention to (1) property rights of the religious authority, 
(2) civic rights and legal rights in relation to religious groups, and (3) the 
educational system. If significant changes are happening in any of these 
dimensions, it should be expected that the political struggles between the 
religious and secular authorities in the state will increase and will likely create 
instability and potential political and social crises in that state until the struggles 
across these dimensions are ended and a new status quo is reached. 
Future studies should also focus on the implementation of machine 
learning and big data on the aftermath of crises. The recent developments in 
machine learning allows researchers to implement natural language processing 
and topic modeling on large corpus of data. Given the online archives provided by 
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states, it is possible to gather data on early parliamentary hearings following 
revolutions. Implementing topic modeling on this data should allow for 
researchers to be able to verify the patterns that are found in this research from a 
quantitative perspective. Using these methods one can even increase the amount 
of cases included in future studies.  The machine learning techniques are not 
limited by the number of languages that a researcher can command; therefore, 
they allow for future research to compare the aftermaths of revolutions even 
when they result in entirely different forms of state structures. 
It is no doubt that just a few years from now, the data used in this research 
will be perceived as relatively small data. Every year more granular and 
comprehensive data becomes available for the researchers. As documents are 
digitized and more data becomes available to researchers, it will be impossible for 
sociologists to ignore it. Yet, they will only add to the explanatory power of 
sociology. Separating valuable data from noise will only be possible if strong 
theories can be provided by researchers. Given the strong tradition and value of 
contributions provided by sociologists from the fields of revolutionary theory, 
social movements, and economic sociology, there is no doubt that the much-
needed theorizing for big data will come from these fields. 
